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INTRODUCTION 
Today, the concept of the “independent” director is widely, if 
not universally, regarded as critical to the healthy governance of 
public corporations.1 The concept remains fiercely contested, however, 
in the governance of investment companies, including mutual funds.2 
This resistance appears on two fronts, one of which is quite visible, 
while the other is often overlooked. The more obvious battle over 
director independence has occurred in response to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s (“SEC’s”) rulemaking effort to alter the 
standard for granting certain regulatory privileges under the 
Investment Company Act (the “Act”).3 The SEC, among its other 
reforms, sought to limit privileges under the Act to companies where 
at least seventy-five percent of the directors and the board chairman 
are independent.4 Those rulemaking efforts have been struck down 
twice on procedural grounds.5 In late 2006, the SEC resolicited public 
comment on two studies addressing the costs and benefits of the 
proposals.6 
 
 1. E.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-
2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007). 
 2. Judith Burns, SEC to Revisit Independence Rule, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2006, at C13 
(noting opposition of the U. S. Chamber of Commerce and the Investment Company Institute to a 
proposed SEC rule requiring an independent chair of mutual fund boards). 
 3. Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520, 69 
Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,380-81 (Aug. 2, 2004) (promulgating rules conditioning exemptions from the 
Act’s requirements for mutual funds with an independent chair and with at least seventy-five 
percent of the fund’s directors being independent of the fund’s investment adviser). The proposed 
rule was adopted by a 3-2 vote of the SEC Commissioners. Id. at 46,390-93 (dissenting opinion). 
 4. Id. The SEC also proposed conditioning exemptions on independent directors holding 
quarterly “executive sessions” separate from the full board and having authority to hire staff 
(including legal counsel) to support them in discharging their responsibilities. Id. at 46,384-85. 
 5. Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 908 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that SEC’s 
re-adoption of the rule violated the Administrative Procedures Act by failing to afford 
opportunity for public comment on certain data used in estimating costs of complying with 
proposed rule); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 143-45 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding 
that SEC violated Administrative Procedures Act by failing to determine costs of its proposed 
conditions and by failing to address a proposed alternative to the independent chair proposal). 
 6. Request for Additional Comment, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,600, 71 Fed. 
Reg. 76,618, 76,618 (Dec. 21, 2006) (permitting public comment until March 2, 2007, on two 
papers prepared by the SEC’s Office of Economic Analysis addressing the costs of complying with 
the conditions in the proposed rule). The December 2006 action by the SEC reopened the 
comment period that was first opened in June 2006. Id.; Investment Company Governance, 
Request for Additional Comment, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,395, 71 Fed. Reg. 
35,366, 35,366 (June 19, 2006). 
 On February 5, 2007, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce filed a Freedom of Information Act 
petition seeking information pertaining to the studies, including information concerning the 
decision to undertake the studies, the methodologies used in the studies, and data pertaining to 
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Mutual fund fee litigation is the second area in investment 
company governance where, in striking contrast to the trend in 
corporate governance generally, the concept of director independence 
remains undeveloped. Section 36(b) of the Act deems an investment 
adviser of an investment company to owe a fiduciary duty with respect 
to the receipt of compensation for advisory services (i.e., management 
compensation).7 That section also creates an express, private right of 
action permitting a security holder, acting on behalf of the investment 
company, to sue the investment adviser or its affiliates for breach of 
that duty.8 The seminal section 36(b) case, decided twenty-five years 
ago, is Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc.9 The 
Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the 
complaint10 and articulated six factors (“Gartenberg factors”) to guide 
the determination whether an investment adviser’s fee is excessive.11 
One factor is the independence of fund directors.12 The independence 
factor, however, has not played a meaningful role in judicial analysis 
of advisory fees under the Act.13 As to scope, it has been regarded, 
unlike developments in corporate law, as essentially equivalent to a 
director falling outside the narrow statutory definition of 
“interestedness” found in section 2(a)(19) of the Act.14 Moreover, of 150 
 
earlier drafts or edits of the two papers. Kara Scannell, Chamber Wants Data Behind SEC 
Studies, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2007, at C7. 
 As of February 21, 2008, the SEC has not yet reissued a rule on independence. 
 7. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970 § 36, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2000). 
Compensation paid to the investment adviser is analogous to the “executive compensation” paid 
to officers by corporations. This is because mutual funds do not have “internal” management; 
instead, they “contract” with an external adviser for such services. See infra notes 34-35 and 
accompanying text. 
 8. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b). The SEC may also bring an action. Id. See generally 4 TAMAR 
FRANKEL & ANN TAYLOR SCHWING, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS: MUTUAL FUNDS AND 
ADVISERS § 34.03 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing case law under section 36(b)). 
 9. 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 10. Id. at 925. 
 11. Id. at 929-30; accord Amron v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Advisors, Inc., 464 F.3d 338, 340-41 
(2d Cir. 2006). 
 12. Id. 
 13. See infra Part III.C. 
 14. Id.; see also Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(a)(9), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19) 
(defining “interested person”); Alan R. Palmiter, The Mutual Fund Board: A Failed Experiment 
in Regulatory Outsourcing, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 165, 170 (2006) (“The definition of 
‘interested person’ makes it relatively easy to seat outside directors sympathetic to management 
firm interests.”). For a critique of mutual fund director independence focusing on the failure to 
consider the relevance of professional relationships, see Larry D. Barnett, When is a Mutual 
Fund Director Independent? The Unexplored Role of Professional Relationships Under Section 
2(a)(19) of the Investment Company Act, 4 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 155 (2006). For a 
description of how “independence” both has been broadened in scope and has become central to 
Delaware’s analytical approach to fiduciary duty issues, see infra Part IV. 
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reported cases citing Gartenberg since 1982, only thirty mention the 
narrowed notion of director independence, with few according it much 
significance.15 Not surprisingly, then, in the twenty-five years since 
Gartenberg, no plaintiff ever has obtained a reported judgment under 
section 36(b).16 
In contrast, over the last quarter of a century, the concept of 
director independence has traced a very different path in the larger 
world of corporate governance.17 Here the concept has expanded, 
flourished, and generally taken hold as a critical component of 
fiduciary analysis. This is not to say the judiciary’s actual handling of 
the independence issue in particular factual settings is always 
commendable.18 Rather, the point is that director independence is 
accepted as an indispensable element of good governance in corporate 
law, and the concept is open textured and fluid.19 In the area of 
mutual fund fee litigation, on the other hand, the concept has 
remained cramped in scope and marginal in significance. 
This Article takes a fresh look at director independence in the 
mutual fund fee context and offers a proposal for reinvigorating it. 
Part I briefly identifies the central agency conflict between mutual 
fund investors and investment advisers and highlights the economic 
significance of mutual fund fees. Part II summarizes strategies to 
 
 15. See infra Part III.C. 
 16. James D. Cox & John W. Payne, Mutual Fund Expense Disclosures: A Behavioral 
Perspective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 907, 923 (2005) (“[P]laintiffs are still seeking to achieve their first 
victory under section 36(b).”). See generally John P. Freeman & Stewart L. Brown, Mutual Fund 
Advisory Fees: The Cost of Conflicts of Interest, 26 J. CORP. L. 609 (2001) (reviewing litigation 
under section 36(b)). 
 17. See infra Part IV. 
 18. For recent critiques of how Delaware courts have interpreted the independence factor in 
specific contexts, see J. Robert Brown, Jr., Disloyalty Without Limits: “Independent” Directors 
and the Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty, 95 KY. L.J. 53 (2006); Harvey Gelb, Corporate 
Governance and the Independence Myth, 6 WYO. L. REV. 129 (2006). For other good discussions of 
recent developments in independence in Delaware law, see Donald C. Clarke, Three Concepts of 
the Independent Director, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 73 (2007); Lisa M. Fairfax, Sarbanes-Oxley, 
Corporate Federalism, and the Declining Significance of Federal Reforms on State Director 
Independence Standards, 31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 381 (2005); E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di 
Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from 1992-2004? A 
Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399 (2005). 
 19. See Hillary A. Sale, Independent Directors as Securities Monitors, 61 BUS. LAW. 1375, 
1376 n.4 (describing Delaware’s corporate law definition of independence as “more nuanced”). 
Independence has not been without its critics, it should be noted. Professor Victor Brudney made 
a strong critique in 1982, and others subsequently have echoed his opinion. Victor Brudney, The 
Independent Director—Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 617-19 (1982); 
see Palmiter, supra note 14, at 202-03 (proposing regulatory options to replace a board-centered 
approach); Wallace Wen Yen Wang, Corporate Versus Contractual Mutual Funds: An Evaluation 
of Structure and Governance, 69 WASH. L. REV. 927, 1008 (1994) (“[B]ecause directors are not 
truly independent, they are vulnerable to coalition politics.”). 
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minimize the adverse effects of these conflicts. One such strategy, 
competition, suffers from weaknesses aptly noted by Professor Donald 
Langevoort,20 such as a lack of activist institutional investors 
exercising influence through voting rights as typically seen in the 
corporate arena. The second strategy, regulation, essentially has failed 
on the section 36(b) litigation front. 
Part III begins by summarizing the emerging and somewhat 
inconclusive empirical evidence on the relationship between mutual 
fund director independence and mutual fund advisory fees. It suggests 
that an exceedingly narrow definition of “independence” is to blame 
for the failure to identify a strong connection between director 
independence and the size of advisory fees. When the independence 
inquiry is broadened beyond the Act’s statutory definition to examine 
past or present business relationships between mutual fund directors 
and advisers or subadvisers, Professor Camelia Kuhnen’s recent study 
finds that such relationships correlate with higher fees.21 In short, 
fiduciary discourse in the mutual fund industry is hobbled (to the 
advantage of investment advisers) by a flawed vocabulary. Language 
matters, and insiders, with regulatory acquiescence, have captured 
the terms of the debate, linguistically deploying what this Article calls 
“ostensible independence” as a counterfeit for genuine independence. 
Part III then takes a critical look at Gartenberg as a prelude to the 
reinterpretation of section 36(b) that is offered in Part V. Part III also 
summarizes salient empirical data on outcomes in mutual fund fee 
litigation under section 36(b) since Gartenberg and highlights the 
scant dispositive role played by director independence in judicial 
analysis. To provide a reference point for assessing this path 
dependent status of independence in the mutual fund industry, Part 
IV chronicles the dramatic expansion of director independence in 
corporate law generally over the same twenty-five year period. 
Finally, Part V offers a proposal for according director 
independence a more prominent role in section 36(b) fee litigation. The 
proposal does not necessitate congressional action—although a more 
robust definition of genuine independence would clarify matters. 
Instead, it offers a new way to understand the text of section 36(b) 
that is informed by the quite different trajectories traced by the notion 
of independence in the mutual fund and corporate governance areas 
 
 20. Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual Funds: 
Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty, 83 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 1017 (2005). 
 21. Camelia M. Kuhnen, Social Networks, Corporate Governance and Contracting in the 
Mutual Fund Industry 18-28 (Mar. 1, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Vanderbilt 
Law Review), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=849705. 
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since 1982. The proposed reading builds on and seeks to implement 
Professor Langevoort’s and Professor Frankel’s calls for a stronger 
norm of fiduciary responsibility in adviser fee litigation and contract 
negotiation under the Act.22 Langevoort argues for a strengthened 
fiduciary norm because he finds analogizing mutual fund governance 
to market-based approaches to corporate governance to be inapt for 
various reasons.23 The proposal advanced in Part V of this Article 
argues, ironically, that to rectify what Langevoort rightly considers 
inappropriate mutual fund “borrowing” from corporate law as a 
strategy to resist tighter oversight, judges should borrow even more 
from corporate law in section 36(b) fee litigation—specifically, they 
should borrow an enriched notion of director independence with real 
procedural significance, thereby bolstering section 36(b) as a credible 
sanction for excessive fees. This Article concludes with some 
reflections on the mutual fund industry’s resistance to independence 
and on the role of private litigation as a key ingredient in any 
regulatory strategy for mutual funds. 
I. CONFLICTS BETWEEN MUTUAL FUND INVESTORS AND INVESTMENT 
ADVISERS 
Late trading,24 market timing,25 and other abusive practices in 
the mutual fund industry have attracted widespread attention.26 
These practices have engendered various proposals for reform and 
reignited debate about how best, or whether,27 to regulate further the 
 
 22. Tamar Frankel, How Did We Get into this Mess?, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 133 (2006); 
Langevoort, supra note 20. 
 23. Langevoort, supra note 20. 
 24. For a description of this practice, see William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An 
Analysis of Rents and Rewards in the Mutual Fund Industry, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1458-60 
(2006). 
 25. For a description of this practice, see id. at 1453-56. For an in-depth analysis, see 
Tamar Frankel & Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Mysterious Ways of Mutual Funds: Market 
Timing, 25 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 235 (2006). 
 26. For a full description of various regulatory responses to the mutual fund scandals, see 
Laurin B. Kleiman & Carla G. Teodoro, Forming, Organizing and Operating a Mutual Fund: 
Legal and Practical Considerations, in THE ABCS OF MUTUAL FUNDS 11, 49-56 (PLI Corp. Law & 
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 8455, 2006), WL 1550 PLI/Corp. 11. See generally 
Conference, The $7 Trillion Question: Mutual Funds & Investor Welfare, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 1 
(2006) (providing transcripts of discussions and essays from a conference on late trading, market 
timing, front running, and related topics held at the University of Maryland School of Law 
through the Business Law Program). 
 27. Some commentators do not favor increased regulation. See, e.g., Paul Mahoney, 
Manager-Investor Conflicts in Mutual Funds, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 161, 179-80 (2004); Larry E. 
Ribstein, Do the Mutuals Need More Law?, 27 REGULATION 14 (2004). 
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mutual fund industry.28 While the exposed practices are significant 
and disturbing, they did not cost investors nearly as much as 
substantial, ongoing management fees.29 As noted by financial 
commentators, payments for management services “are the largest 
expenses of most funds.”30 The SEC’s Office of Economic Analysis 
(“OEA”) recently observed that lower advisory fees are a “critical 
determinant of long-term fund performance”31 and cited a study 
showing that differences in expenses and transaction costs explain 
most of the difference in average and risk-adjusted returns across 
mutual funds over time.32 In short, fees paid to investment advisers 
are quite large in absolute dollar terms and can affect dramatically 
overall rates of return. 
The management structure of investment companies 
inherently creates a significant conflict between investor and adviser 
interests,33 presenting a classic agency problem with respect to mutual 
fund fees. The investment company obtains funds from investors (and 
issues securities in return) and has a board of directors, much like 
other companies. Management of investment company assets, 
however, is not provided internally but by an external investment 
adviser pursuant to an advisory contract negotiated and approved by 
the fund’s board of directors.34 Frequently, the adviser establishes and 
“sponsors” the investment company and provides all necessary 
personnel, facilities, and expertise. The company essentially is a pool 
of portfolio securities, options, futures, loans, cash, or cash 
 
 28. E.g., Mercer E. Bullard, The Mutual Fund As a Firm: Frequent Trading, Fund 
Arbitrage and the SEC’s Response to the Mutual Fund Scandal, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1271 (2006); 
Thomas R. Hurst, The Unfinished Business of Mutual Fund Reform, 26 PACE L. REV. 133 (2005); 
Donna M. Nagy, Regulating the Mutual Fund Industry, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 11 
(2006). 
 29. See Langevoort, supra note 20, at 1018-19 (“The broader issues involve fiduciary 
responsibility across a wide range of matters including management fees, distribution expenses, 
brokerage commissions, and the like.”). 
 30. Diane Del Guercio et al., Governance and Boards of Directors in Closed-End Investment 
Companies, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 111, 112 (2003). 
 31. Memorandum from Chester Spatt, Chief Economist, Office of Economic Analysis, SEC, 
to Inv. Co. File S7-03-04, at 10 (Dec. 29, 2006) [hereinafter OEA Study] (providing a review of 
literature on mutual fund governance), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70304/ 
oeamemo122906-litreview.pdf. 
 32. Id. (citing M. Carhart, On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. FIN. 57, 57-82 
(1997)). 
 33. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 480 (1979) (recognizing “the potential for abuse inherent 
in the structure of investment companies”). 
 34. Section 15(c) of the Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970 requires that the 
advisory contract be approved annually by a majority of the directors on the fund’s board and by 
a majority of the “noninterested” directors. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (2000). 
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equivalents.35 This arrangement has led some, including former SEC 
Chairman Harvey Pitt, to describe mutual funds as “products,” not 
companies.36 For the most part, the investment adviser runs the 
company and, for a variety of reasons, stands in a dominant and 
controlling position with respect to the fund.37 Notwithstanding the 
adviser’s strong position, directors of the company are supposed to 
negotiate the advisory contract on behalf of investor interests and, in 
the words of the Supreme Court, serve as ongoing “watchdogs” over all 
adviser activities.38 
The advisory contract typically charges a fee based on a 
percentage of assets managed and not on fund performance.39 
Investors benefit from a lower percentage while the adviser obviously 
prefers a higher percentage. Moreover, advisers have an incentive to 
maximize assets under management because that raises the aggregate 
fee even when the performance of the fund falters. Investors gain only 
by enhanced fund performance—i.e., higher returns, lower expenses, 
or both. 
Academic literature has identified several conflicts between 
mutual fund investors and advisers. These include differences in 
financial incentives, differences in investor and adviser risk 
tolerances, and cross-subsidization of funds in a fund complex.40 A 
simple illustration of the first, drawn from the recent OEA study, 
highlights the problem: 
New mutual fund investments are highly sensitive to published reports of annual 
performance. Because greater performance implies greater net fund inflows and greater 
net inflows imply greater management fees, managers may alter the risk of the fund to 
 
 35. Zell v. InterCapital Income Sec., Inc., 675 F.2d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1982); Birdthistle, 
supra note 24, at 1409-10. 
 36. Harvey L. Pitt, Over-Lawyered at the SEC, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2006, at A15 (“[The 
Act] treats mutual funds as companies when the economic reality is that they are products.”). 
For a critique of such a viewpoint, see Langevoort, supra note 20, at 1037 (“Once the mutual 
fund is viewed as a product to be marketed . . . then any notion that the producer is a ‘fiduciary’ 
is awkward and disorienting.”). 
 37. The SEC has expressed its concern that “many boards continue to be dominated by their 
management companies.” Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release 
No. 26,520, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,381 (July 27, 2004). 
 38. Burks, 441 U.S. at 485 (stating that disinterested directors are to serve as “‘watchdogs’ 
to protect shareholder interests”). Perhaps the court chose the wrong canine metaphor, as noted 
in an old Chancery decision, In re Kingston Cotton Mill Co. (No. 2), [1896] 2 Ch. 279, 280, 287 
(Ct. App.) (appeal taken from Ch.D.) (describing a watchdog’s role as requiring a reaction only 
when there is something to “arouse [its] suspicion”). In contrast, a bloodhound’s role is that of 
“approach[ing] [its] work with suspicion or with a foregone conclusion that there is something 
wrong.” Steven Schwarcz, Financial Information Failure and Lawyer Responsibility, 31 J. CORP. 
L. 1097, 1119 n.148 (2006). 
 39. OEA Study, supra note 31, at 5. 
 40. Id. at 5-7 (describing conflicts and academic literature). 
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indirectly maximize their own compensation. If a fund is ahead of expectations halfway 
into the reporting period, managers may “pull back” from the strategy preferred by 
investors and reduce the risk of the portfolio in order to lock-in the present level of 
returns, attract more assets and maximize fees from investors. Conversely, if the fund is 
underperforming during the year, managers may be tempted to “gamble” and increase 
the risk of the portfolio to try and catch up to the market so they can minimize the 
impact on fees.41 
The structural-financial conflict illustrated above is 
exacerbated by another common feature of investment companies: 
officers and employees of the investment adviser frequently serve on 
the investment company’s board of directors. As members of the 
investment company board, they owe a duty of loyalty to fund 
investors. As decisionmakers for the adviser, however, they both 
personally benefit from and are in a position to influence a contract 
that is good for the adviser but adverse to the interests of investors. 
This evident conflict of interest is compounded by investors’ inability 
to observe directly or influence the adviser. 
II. STRATEGIES TO MINIMIZE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF CONFLICTS  
A. Competition 
Certain factors, as a theoretical matter, might serve to align 
investor and adviser interests without regulatory (or at least without 
additional regulatory) intervention. For example, the mutual fund 
industry is said to be competitive with more than 8,600 funds in 
existence at the end of 2004.42 Advisers seeking to preserve and 
enhance their reputations to attract greater fund inflows and facilitate 
their own advancement in the adviser labor market have an incentive 
to perform well on behalf of investors.43 Investors’ ability to redeem 
mutual fund shares at net asset value also may impose discipline on 
fund managers because investors can exit the fund without 
dampening the price of fund shares.44 These factors lead some, such as 
 
 41. Id. at 5 (citing literature); see also Jeff D. Opdyke, Mutual Funds Avoid Risk to Lift 
Ratings, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2007, at D2 (describing Goldman Sachs study indicating that 
large-company equity mutual funds sidestep risk to reduce price volatility and gain higher 
Morningstar ratings so as to attract and retain assets under management). 
 42. INV. CO. INST., INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 3 (45th ed. 2005); John C. Coates IV 
& R. Glenn Hubbard, Competition in the Mutual Fund Industry: Evidence and Implications for 
Policy, 33 J. CORP. L. 151, 157 (2007) (“In 2006, there were over 8,000 mutual funds . . . .”). 
 43. Coates & Hubbard, supra note 42, at 210; OEA Study, supra note 31, at 7. 
 44. Stephen Choi & Marcel Kahan, The Market Penalty for Mutual Fund Scandals, 87 B.U. 
L. REV. 1021 (2007) (finding that investors who made significant withdrawals from mutual funds 
and mutual fund families found that fund managers had engaged in wrongdoing); Coates & 
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Professor Paul Mahoney and Professors John Coates and Glenn 
Hubbard,45 to argue for a strategy of enhancing competition as a 
means for reducing the adverse effects of investor-adviser conflicts. 
As noted in the recent OEA study, however, several constraints 
may inhibit the effectiveness of competitive forces in mitigating 
conflicts between investors and advisers.46 These include lack of 
investor knowledge about management and how to assess managerial 
skill; high search and switching costs in fund selection; tax 
considerations on selling shares; and reliance on reputation, trends, 
and recommendations. These constraints demonstrate substantial 
shortcomings in a strategy relying only on market forces to align 
investor and adviser interests.47 For example, one study found that 
Morningstar rankings are inaccurate predictors of future fund 
performance.48 Moreover, Professor Langevoort has identified several 
other ways in which market forces, possibly at work to some degree in 
corporate law, are lacking in the mutual fund industry.49 Salient 
differences include the lack of stock or stock option grants to align 
investor and management interests, the absence of active institutional 
investors advocating governance reforms, the absence (at least in 
mutual funds, though not in closed-end funds) of a market for 
corporate control (i.e., no hostile takeovers), and manager 
compensation based on the value of assets (i.e., size, not 
performance).50 Overall, these features may lead to mutual fund 
assets being “sticky,” rather than mobile, as market theory posits.51 
 
Hubbard, supra note 42, at 162; OEA Study, supra note 31, at 8. This discipline does not operate 
on managers of closed-end funds. 
 45. Mahoney, supra note 27; Coates & Hubbard, supra note 42. 
 46. OEA Study, supra note 31, at 8-10. 
 47. Id.; see also Freeman & Brown, supra note 16, at 651 (“[A]dvisers refuse to compete 
against each other for advisory business . . . .”). 
 48. Christopher R. Blake & Matthew R. Morey, Morningstar Ratings and Mutual Fund 
Performance, 35 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 451 (2000) (noting exceptions for low-rated 
funds); see Remarks of Professor Alan Palmiter, Conference, The $7 Trillion Question: Mutual 
Funds & Investor Welfare, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 23, 26 (2006) (“[T]he [Morningstar] rating is a 
very powerful predictor of future performance—but negatively!”); see also supra note 41 and 
accompanying text. 
 49. Langevoort, supra note 20, at 1031-32. 
 50. Id. 
 51. OEA Study, supra note 31, at 9. Coates and Hubbard recently have sought to rebut 
certain of these claims that competition is lacking in the mutual fund industry. Coates & 
Hubbard, supra note 42. They note: 
[Much of our] evidence on competition is general—we present evidence on market 
structure and investor sensitivity for the overall fund industry, and for general 
investment styles, but we do not attempt to present the multiple, extensive, detailed 
analyses that would be needed to investigate every subsector and competitively 
distinct niche within the mutual fund industry. 
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B. Regulation 
Since the adoption of the Act in 1940, regulation has been a key 
strategy in addressing investor-adviser conflicts in the mutual fund 
industry.52 The Act, unlike state corporate law, substantively 
regulates several aspects of investment company governance. The 
statutory provisions are designed to supplement, rather than preempt, 
state law, at least “to the extent such law is consistent with the 
policies of the [Investment Company Act].”53 For example, state law 
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty continue to govern fund directors. 
The mutual fund board of directors is the governance centerpiece of 
the federal regulatory strategy. The board must negotiate and approve 
the critical advisory contract,54 and, in theory, the board oversees all 
fund affairs to ensure that its adviser complies with the Act’s various 
provisions. 
Two key sections of the Act designed to safeguard investor 
interests in relation to advisers are sections 15(c) and 36(b),55 the 
latter having been added in 1970.56 Section 15(c) requires approval of 
the terms of the advisory contract, initially or as renewed, by the vote, 
cast in person, of a majority of directors who are not parties to the 
contract or “interested persons” of any such party.57 The term 
“interested person” is defined in section 2(a)(19) of the Act.58 
 
Id. at 206. They go on to acknowledge the continuing importance of section 36(b). Id. 
 52. Regulation is not a purely market-based policy approach. For a good overview, see 
Palmiter, supra note 14, at 167-71. 
 53. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 486 (1979). Mutual funds typically are organized as 
corporations, often under Maryland law, or as business trusts, often under Massachusetts law. 
FED. REGULATION OF SEC. COMM., AM. BAR ASS’N, FUND DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK 4 (3d ed. 2006). 
State law principles continue to apply, subject to preemption where they are inconsistent with 
the policies of the Act. Id. 
 54. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (2000). 
 55. Id. §§ 80a-15(c), -35(b). 
 56. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970 § 36, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b). 
 57. Id. § 80a-15(c). Prior to the 1970 amendments, rather than the term “interested person,” 
the Act used the term “affiliated” person. Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 538 
(1984). 
 58. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19) provides as follows:  
“Interested person” of another person means . . . 
(B) when used with respect to an investment adviser of or principal underwriter for 
any investment company— 
(i) any affiliated person of such investment adviser or principal underwriter, 
(ii) any member of the immediate family of any natural person who is an affiliated 
person of such investment adviser or principal underwriter, 
(iii) any person who knowingly has any direct or indirect beneficial interest in, or who 
is designated as trustee, executor, or guardian of any legal interest in, any security 
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In mutual fund parlance, a director who is not an “interested 
person,” as defined in section 2(a)(19) of the Act, typically is described 
as “independent.”59 This deeply ingrained rhetorical practice began in 
 
issued either by such investment adviser or principal underwriter or by a controlling 
person of such investment adviser or principal underwriter, 
(iv) any person or partner or employee of any person who at any time since the 
beginning of the last two completed fiscal years of such investment company has acted 
as legal counsel for such investment adviser or principal underwriter, 
(v) any person or any affiliated person of a person (other than a registered investment 
company) that, at any time during the 6-month period preceding the date of the 
determination of whether that person or affiliated person is an interested person, has 
executed any portfolio transactions for, engaged in any principal transactions with, or 
distributed shares for— 
(I) any investment company for which the investment adviser or principal underwriter 
serves as such; 
(II) any investment company holding itself out to investors, for purposes of investment 
or investor services, as a company related to any investment company for which the 
investment adviser or principal underwriter serves as such; or 
(III) any account over which the investment adviser has brokerage placement 
discretion, 
(vi) any person or any affiliated person of a person (other than a registered investment 
company) that, at any time during the 6-month period preceding the date of the 
determination of whether that person or affiliated person is an interested person, has 
loaned money or other property to— 
(I) any investment company for which the investment adviser or principal underwriter 
serves as such; 
(II) any investment company holding itself out to investors, for purposes of investment 
or investor services, as a company related to any investment company for which the 
investment adviser or principal underwriter serves as such; or 
(III) any account for which the investment adviser has borrowing authority, 
(vii) any natural person whom the Commission by order shall have determined to be 
an interested person by reason of having had at any time since the beginning of the 
last two completed fiscal years of such investment company a material business or 
professional relationship with such investment adviser or principal underwriter or 
with the principal executive officer or any controlling person of such investment 
adviser or principal underwriter. 
 For the purposes of this paragraph (19), “member of the immediate family” means 
any parent, spouse of a parent, child, spouse of a child, spouse, brother, or sister, and 
includes step and adoptive relationships. The Commission may modify or revoke any 
order issued under clause (vii) of subparagraph (A) or (B) of this paragraph whenever 
it finds that such order is no longer consistent with the facts. No order issued 
pursuant to clause (vii) of subparagraph (A) or (B) of this paragraph shall become 
effective until at least sixty days after the entry thereof, and no such order shall affect 
the status of any person for the purposes of this subchapter or for any other purpose 
for any period prior to the effective date of such order. 
 59. See Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208, 1210 (2d Cir. 1978), rev’d, 441 U.S. 471 (1979) 
(“[S]tatutorily disinterested directors, [are] usually referred to as ‘independent directors’ . . . .”); 
Kleiman & Teodoro, supra note 26, at 28 (“Registered funds are required to have a board of 
directors, a majority of whom must be ‘disinterested’ or ‘independent.’”). 
 Some states, also conflating the distinction, have enacted laws providing that a person who is 
not an “interested person” under the Act shall be presumed to be “independent” under state law. 
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-405.3 (LexisNexis 2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 182, § 2B (West Supp. 2007). No doubt, such semantic alchemy increases the number of 
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1940 and is evidenced by a statement of the Chief Counsel of the 
SEC’s Investment Trust Study: 
The bill as originally introduced . . . required that a majority of the board be 
independent of the management. However, . . . it was urged that if a person [the 
investor] is buying management of a particular person and if the majority of the board 
can repudiate his advice, then in effect, you are depriving the stockholders of that 
person’s advice . . . . [T]hat is why the provision for 40 percent of independents was 
inserted.60 
The Supreme Court continued to equate uncritically the 
concepts of disinterestedness and independence in 1979 when it 
described the central role of disinterested directors under the Act: 
“Congress consciously chose to address the conflict-of-interest problem 
through the Act’s independent director section, rather than through 
more drastic remedies such as complete disaffiliation of the companies 
from their advisers or compulsory internalization of the management 
function.”61 Even the SEC has adopted this unfortunate convention.62 
In response to market timing, late trading, and related 
scandals in 2003,63 the SEC sought by rulemaking to bolster the 
independence requirement.64 It did not do so by requiring directors to 
be more independent, but by requiring that a greater percentage of 
directors fall outside the Act’s existing definition of “interested 
person.” In 2004, the SEC conditioned certain regulatory exemptions 
on what it called the independence of at least seventy-five percent of a 
mutual fund’s board and the independence of its chairman.65 
“Independent” means, as it always has in this context, not “interested” 
under the Act.66 The SEC also required enhanced disclosure to 
investors of the material factors and conclusions pertaining to the 
 
“independent” mutual fund directors who can consider, under state law principles, whether to 
comply with a mutual fund investor’s demand that a derivative action be commenced. This is an 
ironic move because, as seen in Part IV, infra, state corporate law principles increasingly 
differentiate between those two notions. 
 60. Martin E. Lybecker, Enhanced Corporate Governance for Mutual Funds: A Flawed 
Concept that Deserves Serious Reconsideration, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1045, 1051 (2005) (citing 
statement of David Schenker, Chief Counsel of the SEC’s Investment Trust Study). 
 61. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 483 (1979). 
 62. In 2004, the SEC stated: “In this Release we are using ‘independent director’ to refer to 
a director who is not an ‘interested person’ of the fund, as defined in the Act.” Investment 
Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,381 
n.23 (Aug. 2, 2004). 
 63. See sources cited supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text. 
 64. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text. 
 65. Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. at 46,381. 
 66. See id. at 46,381 n.23. 
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board’s approval of the most recent advisory contract.67 The SEC 
emphasized the importance of an independent mutual fund board, 
stating: “[A] fund board must be an independent force in fund affairs 
rather than a passive affiliate of management.”68 Although these rule 
changes are mired in litigation on procedural grounds,69 many funds 
have implemented them voluntarily.70 
Structural reform of the sort adopted by the SEC to regulate 
the advisory contract through fund directors is useful but inadequate 
for several reasons. First, the SEC’s conception of independence is too 
narrow because it is equated with a lack of “interestedness” as defined 
in the Act. The definition does not exclude, for example, persons with 
strong personal or business connections to the adviser’s or 
subadviser’s officers, or persons who provide direct or indirect services 
to the funds, or even certain adviser or subadviser family members. 
Nor does the definition address whether directors function 
independently and effectively. Second, neither investors nor the SEC 
are able to monitor closely thousands of advisory contracts ex ante; 
other safeguards are needed if directors and advisers fail to protect 
investor interests. Third, as Professor Langevoort and others have 
argued,71 in the mutual fund industry, market discipline may not 
work for the good of investors as robustly as analogies to market 
forces in corporate governance suggest. Congress recognized this 
argument in 1970, stating: “But in the mutual fund industry . . . these 
marketplace forces are not likely to operate as effectively.”72 Finally, 
in 1970, both the SEC and Congress were uneasy about independent 
boards as a sufficient check on excessive fees. As the Supreme Court 
noted in 1984, “Congress decided not to rely solely on the fund’s 
directors to assure reasonable fees, notwithstanding the increased 
disinterestedness of the board.”73 As a regulatory strategy, therefore, 
director approval of advisory contracts under section 15(c) must be 
 
 67. Disclosure Regarding Approval of Investment Advisory Contracts by Directors of 
Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,486, 69 Fed. Reg. 39,798 (June 
30, 2004). 
 68. Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. at 46,380. 
 69. See cases cited supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 70. Kara Scannell & Tom Lauricella, SEC Considers Fund-Board Compromise, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 15, 2007, at C13 (reporting that eighty percent of mutual funds have boards with seventy-
five percent of its members from outside the industry, according to the Investment Company 
Institute). 
 71. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. 
 72. S. REP. NO. 91-184, 5 (1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897, 4901; see also 
Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 534 n.10 (1984). 
 73. Fox, 464 U.S. at 540; Burks v. Lasker, 441 U. S. 471, 481 n.10, 484 (1979). 
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supplemented by viable private litigation with respect to excessive 
fees. 
Congress provided such an express right of action in 1970 by 
adding section 36(b). That section took on greater significance when 
courts ruled that neither section 15(a)74 nor 15(c)75 supports implied 
private rights of action for excessive fees. Moreover, courts also have 
begun to abandon the longstanding view that section 36(a) supports a 
private right of action.76 Consequently, the one undoubted litigation 
vehicle for protecting investors against conflicts of interest surfacing 
in the form of excessive advisory fees is section 36(b). Given the 
growing uncertainty as to whether other sections of the Act support 
private rights of action, one important interpretive issue under section 
36(b) is the scope of conduct for which the Act provides redress. This 
Article, however, focuses specifically on management fees paid to the 
adviser pursuant to the advisory contract, a matter undoubtedly 
within the coverage of section 36(b). 
Section 36(b) specifies that an investment adviser of a 
registered investment company “shall be deemed to have a fiduciary 
duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services.”77 The 
section provides that the SEC or a security holder of the company, but 
not the company itself, may bring an action on behalf of the company 
against the adviser or any affiliated person “for breach of fiduciary 
duty in respect of such compensation or payments paid by such 
registered investment company or by the security holders thereof to 
such adviser or person.”78 Strictly speaking, the action is not a 
“derivative” action because the company itself cannot initiate a 
lawsuit.79 This frees an investor from any need to make a demand on 
the board of directors before beginning the suit.80 Section 36(b)(1) 
mandates that the plaintiff “shall have the burden of proving a breach 
 
 74. Tarlov v. Paine Weber Cashfund, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 429 (D. Conn. 1983). Section 15(a), 
however, has been interpreted to provide a right of action against an investment adviser accused 
of self-dealing. Fogel v. Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 100 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 75. Halligan v. Standard & Poor’s/Intercapital, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 1082, 1084 (E.D.N.Y. 
1977). 
 76. See Langevoort, supra note 20, at 1025 (collecting authority); Palmiter, supra note 14, 
at 181 n.73 (same). Palmiter argues that a refusal to imply a private action under section 36(a) 
“flies in the face of legislative urgings.” Palmiter, supra note 14, at 181 n.73. See generally 
William K. Sjostrom, Tapping the Reservoir: Mutual Fund Litigation Under Section 36(a) of the 
Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 251 (2006). 
 77. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970 § 36(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2000). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id.; Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523 (1984). 
 80. Fox, 464 U.S. at 527-28. 
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of fiduciary duty.”81 Personal misconduct, however, is not an element 
of the claim.82 No action may be brought against a person who is not 
the recipient of compensation, and any award of damages against such 
recipient is limited to actual damages resulting from the breach of 
fiduciary duty; punitive damages may not be recovered.83 Damages 
cannot be recovered for any period prior to one year before the action 
is commenced.84 Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction,85 and there 
is no right to a jury trial.86 
In sum, as noted by the Supreme Court,87 Congress adopted a 
two-fold regulatory approach to adviser conflicts. This strategy relied 
in part on “the structural requirement” of disinterested director 
negotiation with the investment adviser under section 15, and in part 
on meaningful private fiduciary duty litigation initiated by investors 
under section 36(b).88 The court described this as a “policy choice” to 
provide “independent checks on excessive fees.”89 The dual director 
approval and investor litigation approaches to regulation are not as 
unrelated as Congress thought in 1970 or as the Supreme Court might 
have suggested in Fox. The vital connection between independent 
directors and fiduciary duty litigation becomes clear in a profoundly 
negative way when reviewing case law under section 36(b) over the 
last twenty-five years. A survey reveals that the arrested state of 
development of section 36(b) jurisprudence stands in marked contrast 
to the ongoing development of fiduciary duty litigation in corporate 
law, where the concepts of director independence and fiduciary duty 
are linked. Part III traces the short arc of independence in mutual 
fund fiduciary duty litigation over the last quarter-century, and Part 
IV traces the larger arc in corporate law over the same period. 
 
 81. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(1). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. § 80a-35(b)(3). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. § 80a-35(b)(5). 
 86. Krinsk v. Fund Asset Management, Inc., 875 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 87. Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 538-41 (1984). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 541. 
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III. EMPIRICAL DATA ON MUTUAL FUND FEE LITIGATION SINCE 
GARTENBERG  
A.  Does Independence Matter For Adviser Fees? 
The OEA recently reviewed the rather undeveloped finance 
literature addressing the relationship between board structure and 
fees in the mutual fund industry.90 Some studies find that funds with 
smaller boards and a larger percentage of independent directors tend 
to negotiate and approve lower fees.91 Also, independent directors are 
more likely to authorize share repurchases,92 initiate fund mergers, 
and make decisions designed to benefit investors, such as replacing 
poorly performing managers.93 This led the OEA to conclude 
tentatively that “boards with a greater proportion of independent 
directors are more likely to make decisions such as negotiating lower 
adviser fees that may potentially lead to higher returns.”94 The study 
cautions, however, that due to insufficient data and certain 
methodological factors, there is “no consistent evidence that chair or 
board independence is associated with lower fees and/or higher 
returns for fund shareholders in the cross-section.”95 
Yet, a key assumption in the OEA’s mixed findings—like that 
of discourse generally in the mutual fund culture96—is that someone 
who is not an “interested person” as defined in the Act is an 
independent director.97 However, in an unpublished March 2007 
study,98 Professor Camelia Kuhnen employed a richer understanding 
of independence and examined the effect on investor welfare of past 
business dealings between mutual fund directors and advisers (or 
subadvisers) in advisory contracts for all U.S. mutual funds during 
1993-2002. These kinds of repeated dealings, although not 
encompassed in the definition of “interestedness” (and, hence, 
 
 90. OEA Study, supra note 31. 
 91. Peter Tufano & Matthew Sevick, Board Structure and Fee-Setting in the U.S. Mutual 
Fund Industry, 46 J. FIN. ECON. 321 (1997); see also Del Guerico et al., supra note 30, at 148. 
 92. See Del Guerico et al., supra note 30, at 148. 
 93. OEA Study, supra note 31 at 13. 
 94. Id. at 23. 
 95. Id. at 24. 
 96. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text. 
 97. In fact, the OEA used a definition of independence that assumed all “outside” directors 
were independent. OEA Study, supra note 31, at 2 n.1. That definition, if in fact used, could 
characterize as “independent” certain directors who would be considered “interested persons” 
under the Act. 
 98. Kuhnen, supra note 21. 
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“independence”) under the Act, are precisely the sort of interactions 
that raise concerns about director independence in corporate law. 
Professor Kuhnen found that business connections—
specifically the number of times fund directors have sat on boards of 
any other funds managed by the adviser and a related measure of 
connectivity between the adviser and a potential new subadviser—
foster favoritism in dealings between fund directors and advisers to 
the detriment of investors.99 She found that when mutual funds select 
subadvisory firms to help the primary adviser manage the fund, the 
greater the connection between such firms and fund directors through 
past business relationships, the more likely they are to win the 
management contract.100 Moreover, the more connected subadvisers 
and fund directors are, the lower the net and risk-adjusted rates of 
return.101 Past business connections also play a role in an adviser’s 
selection of directors to serve on new funds sponsored by the 
adviser.102 In addition, Professor Kuhnen found that business 
connections are positive predictors of expense ratios and advisory 
fees.103 She also concluded that all measures of business connections 
are significant negative predictors of the amount of expenses the 
advisor reimburses to the fund.104 For the entire sample, a similar 
increase in measures of director to adviser connections corresponded 
to a 1.5% increase in the advisory fee, which results in an aggregate 
fee increase of $1 billion transferred from funds to advisers each 
year.105 The data, Professor Kuhnen cautions, establishes a correlation 
and does not test for causality between business connections and 
performance.106 The data does tend to rule out information 
asymmetries, ease of monitoring, and reduced search costs as 
plausible reasons for directors hiring advisers whom they have dealt 
with in the past. Overall, the findings strongly suggest that a richer 
conception of independence, designed to identify the variety of 
relationships between fund directors and persons associated with 
advisers and subadvisers, may be useful in identifying funds where 
fees warrant special judicial scrutiny under section 36(b).  
 
 99. Id. at 4-6, 24. 
 100. Id. at 21-22. 
 101. Id. at 20. 
 102. Id. at 22-23. 
 103. Id. at 24-25. 
 104. Id. at 26. 
 105. Id. at 25. 
 106. Id. at 6. 
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B. The Gartenberg Decision 
How important of a role has director independence (using the 
Act’s narrow definition) actually played in section 36(b) fee litigation? 
The leading case under section 36(b) is Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch 
Asset Management Inc., a 1982 decision of the Second Circuit.107 In 
Gartenberg, the plaintiff challenged advisory fees charged by Merrill 
Lynch Asset Management, Inc. on a money market fund that in four 
years had grown from $428 million to more than $19 billion. Although 
the fee as a percentage of net assets declined gradually from 0.5% to 
0.275% for assets in excess of $2.5 billion, the plaintiff argued that the 
fee as a percentage of assets should be even lower due to significant 
economies of scale.108 Six of the eight trustees on the fund board that 
had approved the contract were “noninterested” as then defined in the 
Act.109 
In the district court, Judge Milton Pollack scoured the 
legislative history of section 36(b) for guidance in interpreting the 
fiduciary duty language in the statute. He observed that Congress 
“was not precise in delineating the test for compliance with the 
fiduciary standard.”110 The net effect, he concluded, “would seem to 
leave it to the federal courts to interpret compliance with ‘fiduciary 
duty’ in the common law tradition (. . . really federal equity 
jurisprudence).”111 The Second Circuit, after its own review of the 
legislative history, likewise concluded that Congress had made “no 
attempt to set forth a definitive test by which observance or breach of 
fiduciary duty was to be determined.”112 It found that the adoption of 
the fiduciary duty standard in section 36(b), instead of the 
reasonableness test used in earlier failed bills, was more of a 
“semantical than substantive compromise.”113 
 
 107. 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 108. Id. at 926. See Cox & Payne, supra note 16, at 923-25, for further details of the case. 
 109. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 926. 
 110. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 528 F. Supp. 1038, 1045 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981). 
 111. Id. at 1046. 
 112. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 928. 
 113. Id. As the Supreme Court’s review of legislative history two years after Gartenberg 
made clear, the dispute between the SEC and the mutual fund industry in the late 1960s 
apparently was not so much a disagreement about the substantive standard proposed in earlier 
bills—“reasonableness”—as it was disagreement over who could bring an action. Daily Income 
Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 538-40 (1984). The SEC, in an earlier proposal, sought to have 
Congress empower it to bring actions enforcing the “reasonableness” standard and to intervene 
in any action brought by or on behalf of the company. Id. at 538. The mutual fund industry 
expressed concern about the SEC enforcing a provision as, in essence, granting the SEC rate-
making authority. Id. As an alternative, the Investment Company Institute proposed an 
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In Gartenberg, the Second Circuit phrased the test under 
section 36(b) in two quite different ways. In a famous passage, the 
court seemed to adopt a two-prong approach, stating that to violate 
section 36(b) an investment adviser must charge a fee that is “so 
disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the 
services rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s length 
bargaining.”114 In the preceding paragraph, however, the court 
described a singular focus and asserted that “the test is essentially 
whether the fee schedule represents a charge within the range of what 
would have been negotiated at arm’s length in the light of all the 
surrounding circumstances.”115 Nothing like the “so disproportionately 
large” language appears in this earlier rendition of the test. 
Between its two formulations of the test, the court noted the 
Senate’s appreciation that the structure of a mutual fund did not lend 
itself to the workings of the usual market forces: “The Senate 
recognized that as a practical matter the usual arm’s length 
bargaining between strangers does not occur between an adviser and 
the fund.”116 Thus, the court effectively conceded that the second, 
process-oriented half of the two-prong formulation—i.e., arm’s length 
bargaining—rarely will exist, which makes it an odd element of the 
test. Moreover, the court illogically framed the first prong in a way 
that deviates from “reasonableness” and seemed to require 
extremeness—“so disproportionately large,” not just 
“disproportionately large,” and “no reasonable relationship,” not just 
“unreasonable.” 
Moreover, the “so disproportionately large” language seems 
better suited to capture one way a fee might constitute a breach of an 
adviser’s fiduciary duty, but not the only way. This is seen in a portion 
of the legislative history cited by Judge Pollack, but not by the Second 
Circuit. Judge Pollack noted: 
[Some] members of Congress left open the possibility that in certain limited 
circumstances the fee, considered by itself, might be enough to prove a breach of the 
 
alternative to the SEC bill under which only the company or a security holder could bring an 
action. Id. The proposed industry alternative, however, retained the “reasonableness” standard. 
The provision ultimately enacted by Congress rejected the industry proposal that the company 
itself be authorized to bring suit in favor of permitting either the SEC or an investor acting on 
behalf of the company to initiate an action. The “fiduciary duty” standard also was substituted 
for the earlier “reasonableness” language, but not, apparently, because the industry found the 
earlier language objectionable. Id. at 539. 
 114. 694 F.2d at 928 (emphasis added); see Richard M. Phillips, Mutual Fund Independent 
Directors: A Model for Corporate America?, INVESTMENT COMPANY INST. PERSP., Aug. 2003, at 1, 
10. 
 115. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 928; see Phillips, supra note 114, at 10. 
 116. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 928. 
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section 36(b) standard. Senator Bennett, in his remarks on the bill, stated that the 
section authorized lawsuits “in the event that the fee received is claimed to be so 
excessive as to constitute a breach of fiduciary duty.”117 
By analogy, in corporate fiduciary doctrine, it is accepted that a 
court may infer a breach of fiduciary duty from an egregious 
substantive outcome. As the Delaware Supreme Court has noted, a 
business decision may be substantively “so far beyond the bounds of 
reasonable judgment that it seems essentially inexplicable on any 
ground other than bad faith.”118 An egregious outcome is thus one way 
to demonstrate bad faith; however, it is neither the only way, nor an 
exhaustive definition of bad faith.119 
The Second Circuit, in an effort to elaborate its test, delineated 
several factors related to the manner in which the fund’s directors 
conduct the fee negotiations that are “important” to determine 
whether the adviser violated its fiduciary duty under section 36(b).120 
Notably, however, the court stated that even if the trustees 
endeavored to act responsibly, a fee nonetheless could be “so 
disproportionately large as to amount to a breach of fiduciary duty in 
violation of section 36(b).”121 In other words, the court conceded that 
the test is not solely whether the fee is “so disproportionately large,” 
but that a disproportionate fee is one way for a court to infer that an 
adviser breached its fiduciary duty. Conversely, the court’s language 
also clearly indicates that the behavior of the fund’s trustees is a 
consideration that bears on the adviser’s compliance with its fiduciary 
duty. Thus, if independent fund directors act properly, a 
disproportionate fee still may indicate a breach of fiduciary duty. By 
the court’s own reasoning, however, if fund directors do not behave 
properly, then that improper behavior is an important consideration 
as to whether the adviser breached its duty. 
Furthermore, given the court’s clear acknowledgement that a 
reasonableness standard is appropriate, its phrase “so 
disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the 
services rendered” is either a verbose way to express a reasonableness 
requirement or it wrongly introduces a stricter requirement that 
contradicts the very reasonableness standard that the court seemingly 
 
 117. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 528 F. Supp. 1038, 1045-46 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981) (emphasis added). 
 118. Parnes v. Bally Entm’t Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Del. 1999). 
 119. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006) (noting non-
exhaustive examples of conduct that would establish a lack of good faith). 
 120. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 930. 
 121. Id. 
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endorsed.122 The reading more consistent with legislative history and 
the rest of the opinion is that the court spoke clumsily. Certain 
important conclusions follow from this analysis. For example, the 
waste standard has no application whatsoever, a point that the 
Supreme Court underscored two years later.123 Moreover, the 
deferential business judgment standard of review has no place under a 
“reasonableness” standard, as corporate fiduciary duty jurisprudence 
makes clear,124 particularly when the genuine independence of fund 
directors is not established. Finally, the Gartenberg court ultimately 
concluded that the fees in that case were not unfair and evaluated the 
adviser’s conduct pursuant to the fairness test applied by Judge 
Pollack125 and referred to several times by the court.126 Thus, fairness 
is the applicable standard for judicially reviewing advisory fees. It is a 
strikingly odd feature of the Gartenberg case that Judge Pollack and 
the Second Circuit initially questioned a “reasonableness” standard,127 
but then acknowledged that section 36(b) triggered judicial review of 
adviser conduct by “rigorous scrutiny,” which required “utmost 
fairness.”128 In corporate fiduciary duty law, it is well known that the 
fairness standard of review requires “even more exacting scrutiny” 
than judicial review for reasonableness.129 Under a fairness standard 
of review, courts closely scrutinize both the conduct of a self-dealing 
fiduciary and the substance of the deal struck.130 Thus, by substituting 
 
 122. See Phillips, supra note 114, at 9 (“[T]he directors . . . [have] the duty to satisfy 
themselves on an annual basis that the investment adviser satisfied its fiduciary duty to have a 
reasonable fee.”). 
 123. Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 534 n.10 (1984) (“The new right created 
by § 36(b) is not only formally distinct from that asserted in a state claim of corporate waste; it is 
substantively different as well. Indeed, an important reason for the enactment of § 36(b) was 
Congress’s belief that the standards applied in corporate waste actions were inadequate to 
ensure reasonable adviser fees.”). Thus, Judge Pollack is simply wrong to assert that Congress 
“did not indicate that the common law standard of ‘corporate waste,’ which had previously been 
available to challenge advisory fees, was to be disregarded as an element of the Court’s inquiry.” 
Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 528 F. Supp. 1038, 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 124. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1994) 
(noting situations mandating that a court take a more direct and active role in overseeing 
decisions of directors and subjecting directors’ conduct “to enhanced scrutiny to ensure that it is 
reasonable”). 
 125. 528 F. Supp. at 1045, 1047, 1049, 1055. 
 126. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 926-27, 930. 
 127. Id. at 926-27; 528 F. Supp. at 1045. 
 128. See Gartenberg, 528 F. Supp. at 1045, 1047, 1049, 1055. 
 129. QVC Network, 637 A.2d at 42 n.9. Coates & Hubbard, supra note 42, at 204-05, 
puzzlingly finds “fairness” a more congenial standard for section 36(b) than a “reasonableness” 
standard, but they do not note the stricter scrutiny brought to bear by a court under the former 
standard. 
 130. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983). 
JOHNSON_PAGE 3/25/2008 9:40:58 AM 
2008] GARTENBERG AT TWENTY-FIVE 519 
a fiduciary duty standard for the earlier proposed reasonableness 
standard, Congress did not shift the analytical focus away from the 
substance (amount) of the management fee but heightened the judicial 
standard for reviewing the totality of adviser conduct. 
The Gartenberg court articulated several considerations that 
bear on the section 36(b) fiduciary duty analysis, and later decisions 
distilled these into six factors called the “Gartenberg factors.”131 These 
factors are: (1) the nature and quality of services provided to fund 
shareholders, (2) the profitability of the fund to the adviser-manager, 
(3) fall-out benefits, (4) economies of scale, (5) comparative fee 
structure, and (6) the independence and conscientiousness of the 
trustees. After considering these factors, the Gartenberg court 
affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.132 
C. The Aftermath of Gartenberg 
The most remarkable statistic under section 36(b) is that, 
thirty-seven years after its enactment and twenty-five years after 
Gartenberg, no investor has obtained a verdict against an investment 
adviser.133 Either no adviser has breached its fiduciary duty by 
charging an excessive fee or something is amiss under section 36(b). 
Another telling statistic is that advisory fees do not change 
significantly over time, and advisers rarely are fired.134 As observers 
revisit the Act in the wake of several recent mutual fund scandals,135 
scholars are criticizing Gartenberg and its progeny severely and 
justifiably.136 Scholars raise the question whether, in light of no 
investor victories, section 36(b) is working as intended—i.e., as an 
“independent check” on excessive fees.137 
In the aftermath of Gartenberg, however, two additional 
statistics have not been highlighted.138 The first is that of 150 
decisions citing Gartenberg, only thirty mention its independence 
 
 131. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 132. 694 F.2d at 934. 
 133. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 134. See Camelia M. Kuhnen, Dynamic Contracting in the Mutual Fund Industry 15-16 (Feb. 
15, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Vanderbilt Law Review), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=687530 (noting that only about ten percent of all mutual funds 
renegotiate the management fee or change the subadviser in any given year, and that there are 
only a handful of cases where a primary adviser was fired). 
 135. See notes 24-26 and accompanying text. 
 136. See Langevoort, supra note 20, at 1023-24; Palmiter, supra note 14, at 179-82. 
 137. See Daily Income Fund, Inc., v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 541 (1984) (noting actions under 
section 36(b) intended by Congress to serve as “independent checks” on excessive fees). 
 138.  For an analysis of these two statistics, see infra Appendix A, pp. 537-42. 
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factor.139 Of those thirty cases, sixteen involved motions to dismiss 
that were granted, six involved motions to dismiss that were granted 
in part and denied in part, one involved a motion to dismiss that was 
denied, three involved motions for summary judgment that were 
granted, one was a decision on the merits for the defendant, one 
granted a motion to reconsider, and three involved motions to dismiss 
that were affirmed on appeal.140 All thirty cases that mention the 
independence factor also include the troubling “substantially 
disproportionate” language analyzed supra,141 and forty-nine 
additional cases mentioned that language without discussing 
independence.142 The independence factor, which has been contested 
so hotly in the SEC’s rulemaking efforts,143 does not play an important 
role in very many section 36(b) cases and does not help investors in 
these cases. Moreover, the concept has not evolved over the decades 
and is equated, too simplistically, with a lack of “interest” as defined 
under the Act. 
The second statistic relates to a breakdown of post-Gartenberg 
cases by circuit. Many of the section 36(b) cases are from the Second 
Circuit, where Gartenberg was decided.144 The Sixth and Eleventh 
Circuits have no reported decisions under section 36(b), and the D.C. 
Circuit has only one.145 The Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits are 
the only other circuits that have adopted Gartenberg,146 although 
decisions in the First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits 
clearly refer to the decision.147 
These statistics suggest that some circuits might be open to an 
alternative approach for interpreting section 36(b). Even as to those 
circuits that have adopted, or at least refer to, Gartenberg, renewed 
attention to the crucial but neglected concept of independence offers a 
promising method for injecting greater investor protection into the 
 
 139. See infra Appendix A, pp. 537-38. This suggests that the assertion by Coates & 
Hubbard, supra note 42, at 210, that “[in] most subsequent opinions, the courts appropriately 
spend a substantial amount of time evaluating the credibility, credentials, and reasonableness of 
fund directors in their evaluation of fees,” is not, with respect to the Gartenberg independence 
factor, supported by the evidence. Moreover, Coates and Hubbard predominantly use the term 
“disinterested” director without addressing how a different conception of “independence” under 
section 36(b) might alter judicial review. Id. 
 140. See infra Appendix A, pp. 537-38. 
 141. See supra notes 115-119 and accompanying text; infra Appendix A, pp. 537-38. 
 142. See infra Appendix A, pp. 539-41. 
 143. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text. 
 144. See infra Appendix A, pp. 537-41. 
 145. See infra Appendix A, p. 541. 
 146. See infra Appendix A, p. 541. 
 147. See infra Appendix A, pp. 541-42. 
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fiduciary duty standard adopted in section 36(b). Examining the 
trajectory traced by independence in corporate law over the twenty-
five years since Gartenberg reveals why focusing on the concept of 
independence can increase protection for mutual fund investors. 
IV. THE RISE OF INDEPENDENCE IN CORPORATE LAW SINCE 
GARTENBERG 
If both the contours and the role of independence have 
languished in mutual fund fee litigation in the last twenty-five years, 
they have flourished in corporate fiduciary litigation. Professor Jeffrey 
Gordon has compiled empirical data showing a steady increase in the 
representation of independent directors on corporate boards from 
approximately twenty percent in 1950 to approximately seventy-five 
percent in 2005.148 Bearing in mind that there are different definitions 
of “independence”—a central point of this Article—the trend is 
impressive. 
Understandings of independence in corporate law have been 
enriched from several sources and have broadened considerably over 
the last twenty-five years. The New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”),149 
Nasdaq,150 state fiduciary duty law,151 and prestigious bodies such as 
the American Law Institute and the American Bar Association 
Committee on Corporate Law have contributed valuable perspectives 
on the importance and meaning of “independence” in corporate law.152 
Since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, Congress and 
the SEC have spoken more fully to the independence issue.153 Some 
 
 148. See Gordon, supra note 1, at 1565 tbl.1. A recent survey by Shearman & Sterling found 
that, among the hundred largest public companies, independent directors continue to comprise 
seventy-five percent or more of the boards for the majority of them. TheCorporateCounsel.net 
Blog, http://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/blog/archive/001321.html (Mar. 1, 2007, 5:46 EST) (on 
file with Vanderbilt Law Review) (summarizing Shearman & Sterling’s 4th Annual Corporate 
Governance Survey). The role of independent directors in corporate governance has been 
extensively addressed. See Sale, supra note 19, at 1381 n.32 (collecting commentary). 
 149. The independence requirements for directors of companies listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange are described in Lyman Johnson & Mark Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary 
Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149, 1159-68 (2004). For an argument that the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and NYSE standards may lead “independent” directors to become “public” directors 
whose chief function is risk management, see Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of 
Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1817 (2007). 
 150. Johnson & Sides, supra note 149, at 1168-75 (describing Nasdaq independence 
requirements). 
 151. See infra notes 157-185 and accompanying text. 
 152. See Gordon, supra note 1, at 1481 nn.46-47, 1490 n.93. 
 153. See Johnson & Sides, supra note 149, at 1159-74; see also Executive Compensation and 
Related Person Disclosure, Securities Act Release. No. 8732A, Exchange Act Release No. 
54,302A, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,444A, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158, 53,254-59 (Sept. 8, 
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sources, notably the NYSE and Nasdaq, adopted a rules-based 
approach to the concept of independence after the passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, just as section 2(a)(19) of the Act has done for 
mutual funds. The NYSE prudently has cautioned, however, that it is 
“not possible to anticipate, or explicitly to provide for, all 
circumstances that might signal potential conflicts of interest, or that 
might bear on the materiality of a director’s relationship to a listed 
company.”154 The NYSE also rightly resisted taking the position “as a 
categorical matter that any director who passes the bright line tests 
[under the listing standards] is per se independent.”155  
The influential Delaware courts have taken a more open-
textured standards approach to independence in preference to a 
specific rules approach.156 These courts, which are called on repeatedly 
to delineate the equitable limitations on the exercise of legal powers 
by those owing fiduciary duties, such as directors and controlling 
shareholders, have deployed independence as a core component of 
fiduciary duty analysis over the last three decades. Proceeding by the 
common law method of adjudication, the Delaware courts have shaped 
the notion of independence in a way that is more subtle and efficient 
than what legislation or administrative agency rules alone can do. 
An initial endorsement of independence from the Delaware 
Chancery Court appears as early as 1971 in Puma v. Marriott.157 
Independence in corporate law had not yet been separated fully from 
the related concept of the outside director, and, therefore, the Court 
spoke of “outside, independent directors whose sole interest was the 
furtherance of the corporate enterprise.”158 In 1984, the Delaware 
Supreme Court elaborated a broad, philosophical definition of 
“independence” that, in substance, harkened (without citation) back to 
 
2006) (adopting new item 407 of Reg. S-K and Reg. S-B requiring narrative explanation of 
independence status of directors under a company’s director independence policies). 
 154. See NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A02 cmt. (2004). 
 155. See NYSE Listed Company Manual Section 303A, Corporate Governance Listing 
Standards, Frequently Asked Questions 8 (last updated Feb. 13, 2004), available at 
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/section303Afaqs.pdf. 
 156. See infra notes 157-185 and accompanying text. For another well-developed assessment 
of how Delaware’s approach to the independence issue differs from that taken by the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, the NYSE, and Nasdaq, see Usha Rodriguez, The Fetishization of Independence (Univ. 
of Ga. Sch. of Law Research Paper Series, Paper No. 07-007, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=968513. 
 157. 283 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 1971). 
 158. Id. at 696. See Gordon, supra note 1, at 1478 for a discussion of the era of the “outside” 
director, a concept that preceded the notions of “disinterested” and “independent” in corporate 
discourse. 
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Puma’s more cryptic statement.159 In Aronson v. Lewis, the Supreme 
Court stated: 
Independence means that a director’s decision is based on the corporate merits of the 
subject before the board rather than extraneous considerations or influences . . . . It is 
the care, attention and sense of individual responsibility to the performance of one’s 
duties . . . that generally touches on independence.160  
Vice Chancellor Leo Strine later summarized the independence 
inquiry as asking, broadly, whether “a director is, for any substantial 
reason, incapable of making a decision with only the best interests of 
the corporation in mind.”161 
Many observers question whether genuine independence of the 
sort so loftily described above has been attained, or is attainable, in 
corporate law.162 Other commentators have not faulted so much the 
seemingly broad conceptual definition of “independence,” as they have 
criticized how Delaware courts have resolved the independence issue 
in particular factual settings, especially as courts sometimes may 
underemphasize personal and social connections among directors.163 
The point here is not to contend that Delaware courts always have 
handled the concept of director independence properly in fiduciary 
analyses, but rather to explore the broader meaning and reach of the 
concept as contrasted to mutual fund fee litigation under section 36(b) 
of the Act. 
At a doctrinal level, the conceptual breadth of independence 
articulated in Aronson repeatedly has been reaffirmed.164 Moreover, 
the centrality of the concept in fiduciary duty analysis has been 
underscored, thereby enabling the concept to grow in several ways. 
First, in several contexts, the independence of directors is now a 
pivotal inquiry that goes beyond examining the mere structural or 
putative composition of the board.165 It is significant in director 
conflict-of-interest transactions,166 in reviewing defensive measures 
 
 159. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. 
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
 160. Id. at 816. 
 161. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 938 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 162. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 19. 
 163. See Brown, supra note 18, at 70; Gelb, supra note 18, at 135; Rachel Fink, Note, Social 
Ties in the Boardroom: Changing the Definition of Director Independence to Eliminate “Rubber 
Stamping” Boards, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 455 (2006). 
 164. See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994); Rales v. Blasband, 
634 A.2d 927 (Del. 1993); In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 16415, 2004 
WL 1305745 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004); Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 2002). 
 165. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 166. See, e.g., Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of La. v. Aidinoff, 900 A.2d 654, 669 nn.19-20 (Del. Ch. 
2006). 
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relating to hostile takeovers,167 in determining whether demand on 
the board is excused in derivative litigation,168 in reviewing the 
conduct of special litigation committees in demand-excused derivative 
litigation,169 and in reviewing the performance of special negotiating 
committees dealing with controlling shareholders on major 
transactions.170 Second, the Delaware Supreme Court, invoking 
Aronson’s broad language on independence,171 has emphasized that 
the independence inquiry is not limited to an examination of 
interrelationships between board or committee members and a 
corporate actor owing a fiduciary duty, but also entails examining 
whether such members actually “functioned independently.”172 In 
other words, independence has both a structural and a process 
dimension, the latter often being overlooked. 
Finally, the broad philosophical framing of independence found 
in Puma and Aronson enabled the concept to break free of the 
narrower notion of interestedness with which it often was (and still is) 
confused. In 2002, Chancellor William Chandler wrote that although 
“interest and independence are two separate and distinct issues, these 
two attributes are sometimes confused by parties.”173 Vice Chancellor 
Strine, lauding Chandler’s analysis of independence as “searching and 
sophisticated,”174 summed up the difference between the two 
attributes this way: 
A director is interested if he receives something from the transaction that is different 
than that received by the corporation or its other stockholders. A director is not 
independent if his relationship to a director interested in the decision at hand makes 
him unable to fulfill his duties to the corporation impartially.175 
 
 167. See, e.g., Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 168. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by 
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); Rales, 634 A. 2d 927; In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol. 
S’holder Litig., 919 A.2d 563 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 169. See, e.g., Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); In re Oracle Corp. Derivative 
Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 170. Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422 (Del. 1997); Gesoff v. IIC Indus., 902 A.2d 1130 
(Del. Ch. 2006). 
 171. See supra note 160. 
 172. Kahn, 694 A.2d at 429-30; see also In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 
Civ.A. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745, at *33 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004). 
 173. Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 25 n.50 (Del. Ch. 2002). The Chancellor then goes on at 
length to describe the differences. Id.; see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 official cmt. (1984) 
(noting that the Model Business Corporation Act does not attempt to define independent 
director, unlike stock exchange listing standards, and stating that “disinterestedness” is not 
identical to “independence”). 
 174. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Derivative Impact? Some Early Reflections on the Corporation Law 
Implications of the Enron Debacle, 57 BUS. LAW. 1371, 1380 n.32 (2002). 
 175. Id. at 1377 n.16. 
JOHNSON_PAGE 3/25/2008 9:40:58 AM 
2008] GARTENBERG AT TWENTY-FIVE 525 
Strine also observed that whether a director can “act 
independently” is “inherently situational.”176 This captures the fact-
sensitive, context-laden approach to the subject of independence as an 
equitable standard rather than a bright-line, legal rule. The state law 
approach does not displace and it is not displaced by Sarbanes-Oxley 
or applicable to NYSE or Nasdaq listing standards.177 Rather, each 
supplements the other by taking different regulatory approaches. 
A director may lack independence on a matter, in the sense 
described by Chancellor Chandler, if he is “beholden” to another 
officer, director, or controlling shareholder proposing a transaction 
with the corporation.178 Such a state exists if the other party has the 
direct or indirect power to 
decide whether the challenged director continues to receive a benefit, financial or 
otherwise, upon which the challenged director is so dependent or is of such subjective 
material importance to him that the threatened loss of that benefit might create a 
reason to question whether the controlled director is able to consider the corporate 
merits of the challenged transaction objectively.179 
The reason for concern in these settings was noted cogently by 
French philosopher René Descartes: “A man is incapable of 
comprehending any argument that interferes with his revenue.”180 
Alternatively, a director may lack independence because of a “close 
personal or familial relationship or through force of will.”181 
Notably, the focus is not simply whether a director whose 
independence is at issue has a relationship to the company, as is the 
case under Sarbanes-Oxley and NYSE and Nasdaq listing 
standards,182 but whether that director has a connection to the 
particular fiduciary (director, officer, controlling shareholder) who is 
dealing with the company on a transaction.183 The Delaware “duty” 
approach of examining relationships with particular persons as the 
crux of the independence inquiry reinforces the underlying thrust of 
the “rules” approach because there, too, the ultimate “concern is 
independence from management.”184 Under Delaware’s approach, 
there are numerous cases in which, at particular procedural stages of 
 
 176. Id.; see also Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1049 (Del. 2004) (“Independence is a fact-
specific determination made in the context of a particular case.”). 
 177. See Johnson & Sides, supra note 149. 
 178. Orman, 794 A.2d at 25 n.50. 
 179. Id.; see also In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol. S’holder Litig., 919 A.2d 563 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 180. DANIEL YANKELOVICH, PROFIT WITH HONOR 140 (2006) (quoting Descartes). 
 181. Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 264 (Del. 2002); Orman, 794 A.2d at 25 n.50. 
 182. See Johnson & Sides, supra note 149, at 1213. 
 183. See Rodriguez, supra note 156, at 53. 
 184. NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.02 cmt. (2004). 
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litigation, the independence of one or more directors was found lacking 
or questionable.185 
Many of these instances involved directors who, in the mutual 
fund context, would not be considered “interested” under the Act.186 
For example, a mutual fund director who is a brother-in-law, son-in-
law, or grandson of the investment adviser’s CEO is not interested 
statutorily but should not be considered independent either.187 
Likewise, a fund director who has significant, non-fund-related 
financial dealings with such a CEO or any other senior officer of, or 
principal in, the investment adviser should not be considered 
independent. A director who is, or has a family member who is, a 
partner, co-investor, or party otherwise financially involved with an 
officer or principal of the adviser may not be independent. Concern for 
their own or their family’s well-being may prevent the director from 
placing the company’s interests first.188 Such close personal, financial, 
and, in some settings, social connections189 raise substantial doubts 
 
 185. See, e.g., Telxon, 802 A.2d 257; In re InfoUSA, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 1956-CC, 
2007 WL 2419611, at *16 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2007); In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol. S’holder Litig., 
919 A.2d 563 (Del. Ch. 2007); Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 356, 361 (Del. Ch. 2007); In re 
Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745 (Del. Ch. May 3, 
2004); see also Brown, supra note 18, at 72 nn.93-94, 73 nn.98-101 (collecting additional 
authority); Strine, supra note 174 (collecting authority). 
 186. Cf. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence 
and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 266 (2002) (noting the possibility that 
“some directors who are classified as independent are not truly independent of management 
because they are beholden to the company or its current CEO in ways too subtle to be captured 
in customary definitions of independence”). 
 187. See In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc., 2004 WL 1305745, at *34 (citing family 
relationships found to raise a concern about director independence); Strine, supra note 174 
(same). 
 188. Section 2(a)(19)(B)(vii) of the Investment Company Act includes within the definition of 
“interested person”:  
[Any] natural person whom the Commission by order shall have determined to be an 
interested person by reason of having had at any time since the beginning of the last 
two completed fiscal years of such investment company a material business or 
professional relationship with such investment adviser or . . . with the principal 
executive officer or any controlling person of such investment adviser. 
Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(a)(19)(B)(vii), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19)(B)(vii) (2000). The 
provision, by its terms, requires an SEC order before such a person is considered “interested.” 
Such a determination is not retroactive. See Barnett, supra note 14, at 166-68. Thus, close 
connections between senior officers of an adviser and fund directors are unlikely to make such 
directors “interested” for purposes of section 36(b) litigation. Under Delaware law, by way of 
contrast, concerns about independence would arise in that situation. 
 189. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 938 (Del. Ch. 2003) (finding members 
of special litigation committee not independent); see also Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050-
52, 1054-56 (Del. 2004) (noting that some social connections can raise serious concern as to 
director independence and contrasting independence inquiries in pre-suit demand and demand-
excused contexts). 
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about director independence. But, with respect to a mutual fund 
company, such persons are not considered “interested” under the Act 
and, therefore, automatically are considered “independent.” Finally, a 
director who has other directorships with funds managed (or sub-
managed) by the adviser (or subadviser) may not be a trustworthy 
person to act only in the interests of the fund and its investors.190 
The aim here is not to recount exhaustively the myriad ways in 
which a director may lack independence. Rather, by looking to 
corporate law for guidance, we see that in the mutual fund arena it is 
wrong and simplistic to equate the independence factor under the 
Gartenberg analysis with the Act’s narrow statutory definition of 
“interestedness.” How might mutual fund fee litigation under section 
36(b) draw on corporate law’s more sophisticated understanding of 
“independence” to increase investor protection? 
V. A PROPOSAL FOR BORROWING “INDEPENDENCE” FROM CORPORATE 
LAW TO IMPROVE MUTUAL FUND FEE LITIGATION 
One response to the stunning lack of investor success under 
Gartenberg and its progeny would be for Congress to amend section 
36(b) to better advance investor welfare. This might be done by 
expanding the category of “interested persons” under section 2(a)(19), 
perhaps by removing from subsection (vii) the requirement of a prior 
Commission order.191 Another possibility is to specify more fully and 
precisely the duties of fund directors.192 Perhaps, too, some modest 
exposure to liability on the part of fund directors themselves, of the 
kind suggested in the American Law Institute’s Principles of 
Corporate Governance,193 might lead to greater vigilance in 
negotiating the advisory contract. Another response would be to 
rethink the existing “fiduciary duty” standard in a way that provides 
more meaningful protection for investors. This Article favors the last 
approach. 
In two respects, the independence factor from Gartenberg 
should play a more prominent role in mutual fund fee litigation under 
section 36(b). First, as has occurred in corporate law discourse over 
 
 190. See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text. 
 191. See supra note 188 (noting the necessity of an SEC order determining that certain 
persons come within the statutory definition of “interested person”). 
 192. See Hurst, supra note 28, at 152-53 (calling for statutory strengthening of fiduciary 
duties). 
 193. 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.19 
(1994) (permitting stockholders to limit director or officer liability, but only to the amount of 
annual compensation). 
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the past twenty-five years, the concept of independence must be more 
sharply distinguished from the related, but distinct and narrower, 
notion of interestedness. Although the term “independence” entered 
the vocabulary earlier in the mutual fund industry,194 it continues to 
be a shrunken conception that is equated simplistically with a lack of 
“interestedness.”195 It is perhaps more, not less, important to have a 
robust conception of independence in the mutual fund industry given 
that investors in funds have, overall, less influence over fund affairs 
than shareholders have over corporate affairs. Second, the concept of 
independence must assume greater procedural significance in section 
36(b) litigation. 
The enactment of section 36(b) reveals a policy decision to 
transform the very nature of the investment advisory agreement from 
a mere contractual interaction between the adviser and the fund into 
a fiduciary relationship. By deeming the adviser to owe a fiduciary 
duty, the statute effectively considers the advisory contract to 
represent self-dealing by the adviser in relationship to the fund. A 
core requirement of fiduciary duty is an obligation of loyalty 
prohibiting self-dealing by a fiduciary except under strict conditions.196 
Moreover, the adviser might be characterized as an agent of the 
mutual fund, thereby owing the array of duties, including loyalty, 
owed by an agent to its principal. This applies to subadvisers and 
portfolio managers as well; as subagents they, too, owe an ultimate 
duty of loyalty to fund investors.197 Traditionally, as the Second 
Circuit recognizes,198 a fiduciary who deals with a company to whom a 
duty is owed must carry the burden of proving that the transaction is 
in the best interests of the company and is fair.199 Moreover, judicial 
review of such matters is close and searching, not deferential.200 
Courts review both process and substance in making this overall 
 
 194. See supra text accompanying note 60 (considering the requirement that forty percent of 
the board of a mutual fund be independent); cases cited supra notes 157-161 and accompanying 
text (describing an “independent” director as one who carries out his duties solely in the interest 
of the corporate enterprise without any extraneous considerations or influences). 
 195. See supra notes 59, 61-62 and accompanying text (explaining that both the Supreme 
Court and the SEC have equated the ideas of independence and disinterestedness). 
 196. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 1986) 
(reiterating that a corporate director owes a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the corporation); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006) (explaining that an agent owes a fiduciary duty 
of loyalty to the principal). 
 197. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.15(i) & cmt. d (defining subagent and 
imposing upon subagents a duty of loyalty to the principal). 
 198. Lewis v. S.L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764, 768 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 769; Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983). 
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“fairness” determination.201 If disinterested, independent directors 
carefully approve a self-dealing transaction with a director, for 
example, courts will accord greater deference to that decision because 
they have greater assurance that a “neutral decisionmaker” 
appropriately has approved the matter.202 
Where a special negotiating committee of disinterested, 
independent directors approves a self-dealing transaction with a 
controlling shareholder, however, the directors also must function 
independently; they must bargain freely at arm’s length and make a 
well-advised decision not dictated by the shareholder.203 Even if those 
exacting requirements are met, the court will still review closely the 
matter under a fairness standard but will place the burden of proof on 
the plaintiff.204 The reason for retaining the demanding fairness 
standard (which requires not simply the best price, but also a “fair 
price”) is to address a basic policy concern that arises when a 
controlling shareholder engages in self-dealing. Due to shareholder 
control, directors or minority investors might perceive that their 
disapproval will lead to retaliation by the controlling shareholder; 
such a perception never can be eliminated fully and may taint the 
approval process.205 Therefore, the court, despite various procedural 
precautions, substantively reviews transactions with a controlling 
shareholder under a more stringent fairness standard.206 
Except for the explicit requirement of section 36(b) that the 
plaintiff rather than the defendant shall carry the burden of proof, all 
other typical fiduciary safeguards should be construed as falling 
within the statutory “fiduciary duty” standard. Fiduciary standards in 
business governance, being equitable in nature as Judge Pollack 
recognized in Gartenberg,207 are not abstract and fixed principles, but 
rather exist in particular historical and institutional settings and 
must continually be informed by “evolving standards” of expected 
conduct.208 This means that the enhancements in fiduciary duty 
 
 201. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711. 
 202. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1170 & n.25 (Del. 1995). 
 203. See cases cited supra note 172 and accompanying text (discussing the Delaware 
Supreme Court’s emphasis on the functional independence of directors). 
 204. Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. 1994); In re Cysire, Inc. 
S’holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 548 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 205. Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1116; In re Cysive, Inc., 836 A.2d at 548. 
 206. Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1116; In re Cysive, Inc., 836 A.2d at 548. 
 207. See supra notes 110-111 and accompanying text (quoting Judge Milton Pollack’s 
description of the proper interpretation of the statutory fiduciary duty language). 
 208. It is worth recalling a comment about the duty of care made by the ALI PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: “[T]he ‘duty’ . . . component[] of duty of care provisions [is] . . . flexible 
and dynamic . . . . [O]bligations may change over time to reflect new conditions or revised 
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protections for investors that have been developed in corporate law 
over the last twenty-five years should be transplanted into section 
36(b) litigation as a matter of federal law. One of these developments 
is the more far-reaching and fluid definition of “independence” used in 
corporate law. 
The Gartenberg independence factor, cited just thirty times in 
the last twenty-five years,209 must become far more prominent in 
mutual fund fee litigation. The beginning point is to appreciate that, 
under the equitable fiduciary duty standard of section 36(b), the 
independence requirement goes well beyond the Act’s statutory 
requirement that fund directors approving the advisory contract under 
section 15(c) not be “interested.” In effect, the nature of fiduciary 
discourse in the mutual fund industry needs to mature and “catch up” 
with the parallel discourse in corporate law. The SEC came close to 
recognizing this but still missed the mark when it stated that “[w]e 
recognize that ‘legal’ lack of interestedness does not equate with ‘real’ 
independence.”210 That is a true observation, but it lacks legal “bite.” 
What the SEC should have said is that “legal” lack of interestedness 
under section 2(a)(19) and section 15(c) of the Act does not equate 
automatically to genuine independence under section 36(b)’s statutory 
requirement that an equitable fiduciary duty standard of 
independence be met. Correctly understanding the relationship 
between “interestedness” and “independence” permits the fiduciary 
duty standard of section 36(b) to be interpreted as legally requiring 
“real” independence. 
Beyond the need for a broader conception of independence—
with respect to both the structure and actual functioning of the 
mutual fund board—section 36(b)(2) offers a way to alter the 
procedural obligations of each party on the independence issue. 
Section 36(b)(2) provides, in essence, that approval of the advisory 
contract by the mutual fund board “shall be given such consideration 
 
business practices or mores. Duty of care provisions should be interpreted in light of 
contemporary conditions.” 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(a) cmt. b (1994); see also Paul H. Dawes, Caremark and the Duty of 
Care, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 2000, at 219, 225 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook 
Series No. B-1199, 2000) (“That directors owe their organizations a duty of care is a venerated 
standard of business law, widely if not universally accepted by the legal and financial 
community. The understanding of what that duty entails, however, has changed significantly 
over time.” (emphasis added)). The same sensitivity to change applies with respect to the duty of 
loyalty and to our understanding of independence. 
 209. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (arguing that the evidence does not support 
the assertion that “the courts appropriately spend a substantial amount of time evaluating the 
credibility, credentials, and reasonableness of fund directors in their evaluation of fees”). 
 210. Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520, 69 
Fed. Reg. 46,380 (July 27, 2004). 
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by the court as is deemed appropriate under all the circumstances.”211 
We know from corporate fiduciary law that courts treat fully informed 
decisions by independent directors differently than those made by 
non-independent directors.212 Given the longstanding and quite 
significant concerns about whether fund boards continue to be 
dominated by investment advisers,213 there is no reason to presume 
that an independent fund board approved the advisory contract; 
corporate law does not make that presumption with respect to 
controlling shareholders. If advisers want significance attached to 
director approval, they should establish the independence (broadly 
understood) of a majority of the directors on the fund board.214 This 
goes not only to structural independence; just as Delaware courts ask 
whether directors were fully informed and “functioned” independently, 
courts under section 36(b) must ask whether fund directors acted with 
“care and conscientiousness” in how they were informed and actually 
functioned. Then, if such independence is established, “appropriate” 
consideration should lead a court to substitute a somewhat more 
deferential “reasonableness” standard for the more searching 
“fairness” standard.215 If, however, the adviser does not establish the 
independence of a majority of the fund board’s directors, then the 
“consideration” that is “appropriate” with respect to approval of the 
advisory contract is markedly heightened judicial skepticism, along 
with continued application of the exacting fairness standard.216 
 
 211. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970 § 36(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(2) 
(2000). 
 212. See supra notes 164-169 and accompanying text (listing several contexts in which courts 
consider the independence of directors). 
 213. See Birdthistle, supra note 24, at 1442 (asserting that the market for investment 
advisers is not fluid). 
 214. There are two settings in corporate law where the defendant bears the burden of 
establishing independence. The first is in the demand-excused derivative litigation setting where 
the special litigation committee bears the burden of proving its independence. In re Oracle Corp. 
Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 937 (Del. Ch. 2003). The second setting involves transactions 
between the company and controlling shareholders. Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 429 
(Del. 1997). 
 215. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (noting that the fairness standard requires 
“even more exacting scrutiny” than the reasonableness standard). 
 216. Vice Chancellor Stephen Lamb recently described how economic fairness will have a 
narrower range when a fiduciary self-deals with non-independent persons by means of a faulty 
process: 
[W]here the pricing terms of a transaction that is the product of an unfair process 
cannot be justified by reference to reliable markets or by comparison to substantial 
and dependable precedent transactions, the burden of persuading the court of the 
fairness of the terms will be exceptionally difficult. Relatedly, where an entire fairness 
review is required in such a case of pricing terms that, if negotiated and approved at 
arm’s-length, would involve a broad exercise of discretion or judgment by the 
directors, common sense suggests that proof of fair price will generally require a 
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This approach gives the oft-overlooked section 36(b)(2) a 
dignity equal to the more commonly cited section 36(b)(1), which 
places the burden of proving a breach of fiduciary duty on the 
plaintiff.217 Under the approach outlined above, the plaintiff retains 
the ultimate burden of proof throughout. The adviser, however, has a 
choice. If the adviser elects not to establish the independence of fund 
directors, or seeks to do so but fails, then section 36(b)(2) mandates 
that no (or even negative) consideration or weight be given to director 
approvals, and the plaintiff then must address the other Gartenberg 
factors with the court reviewing for fairness. If the adviser elects to 
establish, and succeeds in establishing, the independence of fund 
directors, the plaintiff must address the other Gartenberg factors with 
the court reviewing the advisory contract under a lesser standard of 
reasonableness. Alternatively, a court might rule that a plaintiff 
proves a breach of fiduciary duty by showing that the defendant-
adviser obtained the contract without the approval of truly 
independent directors. Notwithstanding the breach, the defendant 
could be given the opportunity to avoid liability by establishing the 
fairness of the contract. This system mirrors the practice in corporate 
law, where a proven breach of the duty of care by the plaintiff does not 
lead to liability per se, but shifts the burden of proving fairness to the 
defendant.218 Under either approach, a court should be exceedingly 
reluctant to dismiss, before trial, an action involving an advisory 
contract where the genuine independence of the fund board has not 
been established clearly.219 
This approach to reviewing the advisory contract corresponds 
to the approach corporate law takes in reviewing significant 
transactions between controlling shareholders and the companies that 
they control. Delaware courts have described these matters as 
“inherently coercive,”220 the precise structural concern that both 
Congress and the courts have identified in the mutual fund advisory 
 
showing that the terms of the transaction fit comfortably within the narrow range of 
that discretion, not at its outer boundaries. 
Valeant Pharms. Int’l v. Jerney, 921 A.2d 732, 748-49 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 217. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970 § 36(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(1) 
(2000). 
 218. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1163 (Del. 1995). 
 219. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1223-24 (Del. 1999) (noting that close 
judicial scrutiny under the demanding Lynch doctrine often precludes dismissal); Kahn, 694 A.2d 
at 428 (same). 
 220. In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745, at 
*32 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004). 
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relationship.221 It also parallels the approach taken by Delaware 
courts in derivative litigation where demand has been excused as 
futile but a special litigation committee thereafter seeks dismissal. 
The committee’s independence in that setting is not presumed; it must 
be established.222 The concerns that underlie section 36(b)—indeed, 
the concerns pervading the entire Act—similarly warrant special 
judicial vigilance on the independence issue. 
The remedy under section 36(b) is restitutionary in nature, 
although in principle a breach of fiduciary duty need not be so 
limited.223 The remedy is that the adviser returns that portion of the 
fee that is excessive.224 Such a sanction may not prevent adviser 
overreaching because the only penalty for a successful investor 
lawsuit is the restoration of ill-gotten gain, which may not prove to be 
a behavioral deterrent. At the same time, such a remedy forecloses 
those policy concerns that sometimes are raised about damage awards 
against corporate directors deterring service by qualified persons or 
inducing suboptimal risk-averse behavior.225 A credible monetary 
sanction clearly reinforces the statutory requirement that 
“noninterested” directors must be the key decisionmakers for mutual 
fund matters, including the advisory contract. 
In this way, mutual fund fee litigation complements the policy 
aims sought by the stalled SEC rules on director independence.226 Risk 
of liability under section 36(b)—even if that risk is only marginally 
heightened and only occasionally realized because some directors no 
longer are considered “independent” under the broader reach of that 
term advocated here—likely will induce advisers to ensure more 
zealously that directors who approve the advisory contract truly are 
both disinterested and independent. This is especially true if an 
adviser suffering an adverse verdict under section 36(b) were required 
to disclose that fact prominently in communications to investors for, 
say, the next year or so. That rule introduces reputational 
considerations into adviser conduct. Greater risk of an adverse 
outcome for the adviser should serve investor interests better by 
 
 221. See supra notes 33, 37 and accompanying text (noting the dominant and controlling 
position of most investment advisers and the potential for conflicts between investor and adviser 
interests). 
 222. See supra note 214. 
 223. See Deborah A. DeMott, Disloyal Agents, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1049, 1056-61 (2007) 
(describing various remedies for an agent’s breach of duty). 
 224. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970 § 36(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(3) 
(2000). 
 225. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. 
LAW. 439, 455-56 (2005) (discussing concerns). 
 226. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text. 
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eventually inculcating a stronger norm of fiduciary obligation on both 
the advisers’ and fund directors’ parts. To alter institutional norms in 
the mutual fund industry may require an occasional legal “nudge” 
from the judiciary—i.e., an investor victory. Healthy norms often are 
undergirded and nourished by sound regulation;227 at least the two 
cannot be at odds, as they seem to be today. A heightened norm and 
culture of loyalty to investor interests may lead to real bargaining for 
lower fees of the kind at least modestly seen, for example, with the 
AIM Funds.228 Some greater evidence of genuine bargaining over 
advisory fees may instill greater public confidence and, at some point, 
lead to another twenty-five years with no investor victories under 
section 36(b), but for the quite different reason that such wins finally 
are not needed anymore. 
CONCLUSION 
Fiduciary duty discourse has traced a “path dependent” course   
in the cabined world of mutual fund fee litigation. As a result, the 
“fiduciary duty” regulatory approach to advisory fees adopted in 
section 36(b) has failed to provide meaningful investor protection. One 
reason is that courts continue to be guided by Gartenberg, a 1982 case 
that articulated a faulty test for assessing fiduciary conduct and 
spelled out six factors, one of which—independence—is stalled where 
it was twenty-five years ago. Meanwhile, over that same period, 
fiduciary duty analysis generally, and the independence inquiry 
specifically, have matured and become more nuanced in corporate law. 
This is not to say such change always has served investor interests, 
and this Article does not make that claim for corporate decisional law. 
 
 227. YANKELOVICH, supra note 180, at 137; Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, The 
Legal Environments of Organizations, 23 ANN. REV. SOC. 479, 479 (1997). The proposed approach 
of heightened judicial attention to the independence factor under section 36(b) is fully consistent 
with the findings of Coates & Hubbard, supra note 42, at 205-06, as to the “overall” 
competitiveness of the mutual fund industry. Their legal and economic analysis leads them to 
conclude that courts under Section 36(b) should continue to assess the role and effectiveness of 
fee approvals by disinterested directors. Id. at 55-56. The thesis of this article is that, in doing so, 
courts must be more vigilant in ensuring that directors are genuinely independent. 
 228. Tom Lauricella, Independent Directors Strike Back, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2006, at R1 
(describing fund director success in bargaining with advisers for lower fees). Mutual fund culture 
may currently be changing in another respect, as well—the increased willingness of mutual 
funds to be more “activist” investors, just as public pension funds and other institutional 
investors have been doing for some time on various corporate governance issues. See JoAnn S. 
Lublin & Phred Dvorak, The Insiders: How Five New Players Aid Movement to Limit CEO Pay, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2007, at A1 (describing increase in assertiveness on governance issues by 
Putnam fund trustees); Kaja Whitehouse, The Activist Game: It’s Not Just for Hedgies, WALL ST. 
J., Mar. 14, 2007, at C15 (describing increase in mutual fund activism). 
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Rather, it is to say that fiduciary analysis in corporate law remains 
open textured and adaptive, and, therefore, it has grown and retained 
significance over the years. Delaware courts, in short, attend to 
fiduciary duty as their unique and valuable contribution to corporate 
law. Federal courts address fiduciary duty issues infrequently, and 
therefore, they have little practice or expertise with respect to 
fiduciary analysis. Moreover, unlike Delaware courts, they receive 
little reputational payoff for expertise in the area, and they do not 
need to “compete” with other lawmaking jurisdictions. Accordingly, 
they appear content in section 36(b) cases to recite woodenly an 
approach long abandoned in corporate law. The result is that the all-
important concept of “fiduciary duty” in mutual fund fee litigation is 
frozen in 1982, where courts seem happy to leave it. This might not 
matter if other market-based forces brought discipline to advisory fees 
or if institutional investors pressed directors for tighter scrutiny of 
management compensation, as in the corporate world. The absence of 
these influences in the mutual fund industry means that regulation, 
including both agency rulemaking and fiduciary duty litigation, must 
be a more potent disciplinary mechanism. 
Although the industry never has been defeated in a section 
36(b) case, it nonetheless resists proposed rules requiring an 
independent chair and a seventy-five percent majority of independent 
directors. Of course, “independence” in the mutual fund lexicon means 
something narrower than it does in corporate law. It means 
“ostensible independence.” But that difference makes the resistance 
more puzzling. Perhaps industry insiders believe that ostensible 
independence is an acceptable regulatory outcome but that genuine 
independence is not. Genuine independence looks beyond a mere lack 
of “interestedness” as defined in the Act and explores business and 
other connections between fund directors and advisory and 
subadvisory personnel, much as in contemporary corporate law. 
Moreover, as Professor Kuhnen concludes genuine independence may 
result in lower advisory fees. 
Ostensible independence is a social convention that does not 
demonstrably lower fees. Consequently, the fund industry can live 
with ostensible independence for now. A strategy that resists a policy 
initiative aimed at increasing the number of ostensibly independent 
directors is a strategy that, even if it loses, successfully can resist 
direct government regulation of fees and preserve vast autonomy over 
compensation. What really matters, and what the new numerical rules 
on independence only approximate, is genuine independence, a 
concept that cannot be legislated categorically but only can be 
examined—as Delaware corporate law so clearly reveals—on a case-
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by-case basis in particular contexts. Therefore, a political strategy of 
resisting the new rules, but then acquiescing or compromising, 
provides good cover while still preserving fees. 
Investors in mutual funds, following the lead of shareholders in 
public corporations,229 could seek to amend fund bylaws to adopt a 
stricter definition of “independence.” With respect to section 36(b), 
however, only courts can demand genuine independence, rather than 
its appearance, from fund directors. By looking to modern corporate 
fiduciary discourse for guidance, courts may conclude that some 
“disinterested” directors under the Act are not really “independent.” 
By refashioning independence—which is, after all, a Gartenberg 
factor—to be more contemporary and central to their analysis, courts 
are unlikely to open the floodgates of litigation. They probably will 
disqualify some fund directors from the “independent” category. 
Perhaps that will give investors a few victories under section 36(b), 
thereby making derivative litigation a more “serviceable mechanism” 
for attaining accountability.230 More importantly, that first win or two 
may motivate both advisers and fund directors to adopt a stricter, 
more appropriate definition of independence for director selection 
purposes. That, in turn, may begin to inculcate a healthier norm and 
culture of genuine independence in the mutual fund industry, to the 
good of investors. 
 
 
 229. Lublin & Dvorak, supra note 228 (describing bylaw amendments as one technique for 
increased investor voice on governance issues). 
 230. Langevoort, supra note 20, at 1043. 
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Appendix A 
 
The thirty decisions citing the Gartenberg independence factor, 
all of which also cite the “substantially disproportionate” language, 
are as follows: 
Amron v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Advisors, Inc., 464 F.3d 338 (2d 
Cir. 2006); Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int’l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321 (4th 
Cir. 2001); Krinsk v. Fund Asset Mgmt., Inc., 875 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 
1989); In re Scudder Mut. Funds Fee Litig., No. 04 Civ. 1921 (DAB), 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59643 (D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2007); Gallus v. 
Ameriprise Fin., 497 F. Supp. 2d 974 (D. Minn. 2007); Jones v. Harris 
Assocs. L.P., No. 04 C 8305, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13352 (D. Ill. Feb. 
27, 2007); In re Evergreen Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 240 F.R.D. 115 
(D.N.Y. 2007); Sins v. Janus Capital Mgmt., LLC, Civ. A. No. 04-cv-
01647-WDM-MEH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90673 (D. Colo. Dec. 15, 
2006); Siemers v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. C 05-04518 WHA, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 60858 (D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2006); Hunt v. Invesco Funds 
Group, Civ. A. No. H-04-02555, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40944 (D. Tex. 
June 5, 2006); In re AllianceBernstein Mut. Fund Excessive Fee Litig., 
No. 04 Civ. 4885 (SWK), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 939 (D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 
2006); In re AllianceBernstein Mut. Fund Excessive Fee Litig., No. 04 
Civ. 4885 (SWK), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24263 (D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2005); 
In re Columbia Entities Litig., Civ. A. No. 04-11704-REK, 2005 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 33439 (D. Mass. Nov. 30, 2005); Yameen v. Eaton Vance 
Distribs., 394 F. Supp. 2d 350 (D. Mass. 2005); In re Dreyfus Mut. 
Funds Fee Litig., 428 F. Supp. 2d 342 (D. Pa. 2005); Gallus v. Am. 
Express Fin. Corp., 370 F. Supp. 2d 862 (D. Minn. 2005); Pfeiffer v. 
Bjurman, Barry & Assocs., No. 03 Civ. 9741 (DLC), 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16924 (D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2004); Benak v. Alliance Capital Mgmt. 
L.P., Civ. A. No. 01-5734, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12231 (D.N.J. Feb. 9, 
2004); Miller v. Mitchell Hutchins Asset Mgmt., Inc., No. 01-CV-0192-
DRH, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27675 (D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2002); Strougo v. 
Bea Assocs., 188 F. Supp. 2d 373 (D.N.Y. 2002); Green v. Nuveen 
Advisory Corp., No. 97 C 5255, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14047 (D. Ill. 
Sept. 6, 2001); Krantz v. Fidelity Mgmt. & Research, Co., 98 F. Supp. 
2d 150 (D. Mass. 2000); Migdal v. Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int’l, 
Inc., Civ. No. AMD 98-2162, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22853 (D. Md. 
Mar. 20, 2000); Krantz v. Prudential Invs. Fund Mgmt. L.L.C., 77 F. 
Supp. 2d 559 (D.N.J. 1999); Verkouteren v. Blackrock Fin. Mgmt., 
Inc., No. 98 Civ. 4673 (WK), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10892 (D.N.Y. July 
16, 1999); Verkouteren v. Blackrock Fin. Mgmt., Inc., 37 F. Supp. 2d 
256 (D.N.Y. 1999); Strougo ex rel. Brazil Fund v. Scudder, Stevens & 
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Clark, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 783 (D.N.Y. 1997); Kalish v. Franklin 
Advisers, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 1222 (D.N.Y. 1990); Krinsk v. Fund Asset 
Mgmt., Inc., 715 F. Supp. 472 (D.N.Y. 1988); Schuyt v. Rowe Price 
Prime Reserve Fund, 663 F. Supp. 962 (D.N.Y. 1987). 
 
The sixteen decisions involving motions to dismiss that were 
granted are as follows: 
In re Scudder Mut. Funds Fee Litig., No. 04 Civ. 1921 (DAB), 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59643 (D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2007); In re Evergreen 
Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 240 F.R.D. 115 (D.N.Y. 2007); Sins v. Janus 
Capital Mgmt., LLC, Civ. A. No. 04-cv-01647-WDM-MEH, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 90673 (D. Colo. Dec. 15, 2006); In re AllianceBernstein 
Mut. Fund Excessive Fee Litig., No. 04 Civ. 4885 (SWK), 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 939 (D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2006); In re Columbia Entities Litig., 
Civ. A. No. 04-11704-REK, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33439 (D. Mass. 
Nov. 30, 2005); Yameen v. Eaton Vance Distribs., 394 F. Supp. 2d 350 
(D. Mass. 2005); Benak v. Alliance Capital Mgmt. L.P., Civ. A. No. 01-
5734, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12231 (D.N.J. Feb. 9, 2004); Miller v. 
Mitchell Hutchins Asset Mgmt., Inc., No. 01-CV-0192-DRH, 2002 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 27675 (D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2002); Strougo v. Bea Assocs., 188 
F. Supp. 2d 373 (D.N.Y. 2002); Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int’l, 
Inc., Civ. No. AMD 98-2162, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22853 (D. Md. 
Mar. 20, 2000); Krantz v. Prudential Invs. Fund Mgmt. L.L.C., 77 F. 
Supp. 2d 559 (D.N.J. 1999); Verkouteren v. Blackrock Fin. Mgmt., 
Inc., No. 98 Civ. 4673 (WK), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10892 (D.N.Y. July 
16, 1999); Verkouteren v. Blackrock Fin. Mgmt., Inc., 37 F. Supp. 2d 
256 (D.N.Y. 1999); Strougo ex rel. Brazil Fund v. Scudder, Stevens & 
Clark, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 783 (D.N.Y. 1997); Kalish v. Franklin 
Advisers, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 1222 (D.N.Y. 1990); Krinsk v. Fund Asset 
Mgmt., Inc., 715 F. Supp. 472 (D.N.Y. 1988). 
 
The six decisions involving motions to dismiss that were 
granted in part and denied in part are as follows: 
Siemers v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. C 05-04518 WHA, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 60858 (D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2006); In re AllianceBernstein 
Mut. Fund Excessive Fee Litig., No. 04 Civ. 4885 (SWK), 2005 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 24263 (D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2005); In re Dreyfus Mut. Funds 
Fee Litig., 428 F. Supp. 2d 342 (D. Pa. 2005); Gallus v. Am. Express 
Fin. Corp., 370 F. Supp. 2d 862 (D. Minn. 2005); Pfeiffer v. Bjurman, 
Barry & Assocs., No. 03 Civ. 9741 (DLC), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16924 
(D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2004); Krantz v. Fidelity Mgmt. & Research, Co., 98 
F. Supp. 2d 150 (D. Mass. 2000). 
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The single decision denying a motion to dismiss was Hunt v. 
Invesco Funds Group, Civ. A. No. H-04-02555, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
40944 (D. Tex. June 5, 2006). 
 
The three decisions granting motions for summary judgment 
are as follows: 
Gallus v. Ameriprise Fin., 497 F. Supp. 2d 974 (D. Minn. 2007); 
Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., No. 04 C 8305, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
13352 (D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2007); Green v. Nuveen Advisory Corp., No. 97 
C 5255, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14047 (D. Ill. Sept. 6, 2001). 
 
The single decision on the merits for the defendant was Schuyt 
v. Rowe Price Prime Reserve Fund, 663 F. Supp. 962 (D.N.Y. 1987). 
 
The single decision granting a motion to reconsider was In re 
AllianceBernstein Mut. Fund Excessive Fee Litig., No. 04 Civ. 4885 
(SWK), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 939 (D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2006). 
 
The three decisions involving motions to dismiss that were 
affirmed on appeal are as follows: 
Amron v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Advisors, Inc., 464 F.3d 338 (2d 
Cir. 2006); Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int’l, 248 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 
2001); Krinsk v. Fund Asset Mgmt., Inc., 875 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 
The forty-nine decisions mentioning the “substantially 
disproportionate” language but not discussing independence are as 
follows: 
Bellikoff v. Eaton Vance Corp., 481 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2007); 
Verkouteren v. Blackrock Fin. Mgmt., Inc., No. 99-9005, 2000 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 4487 (2d Cir. Mar. 21, 2000); Levy v. Alliance Capital 
Mgmt. L.P., No. 98-9528, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20213 (2d Cir. Aug. 
20, 1999); Meyer v. Oppenheimer Management Corp., 895 F.2d 861 
(2d Cir. 1990); Meyer v. Oppenheimer Management Corp., 764 F.2d 76 
(2d Cir. 1985); Alexander v. Member Cases Allianz Dresdner Asset 
Mgmt. of Amer. Holding, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D. Conn. 2007); In 
re Franklin Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 478 F. Supp. 2d 677 (D.N.J. 2007); 
Fitzgerald v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 03 Civ. 4305 (DAB), 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 15365 (D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2007); Mintz v. Baron, No. 05 Civ. 4904 
(LTS)(HBP), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66867 (D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2006); 
Everett v. Bozic, No. 05 Civ. 00296 (DAB), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
55824 (D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2006); In re Salomon Smith Barney Mut. Fund 
Fees Litig., 441 F. Supp. 2d 579 (D.N.Y. 2006); In re Merrill Lynch 
Inv. Mgmt. Funds Sec. Litig., 434 F. Supp. 2d 233 (D.N.Y. 2006); In re 
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Mut. Funds Inv. Litig. v. Deutsche Bank AG, 437 F. Supp. 2d 449 (D. 
Md. 2006); In re Morgan Stanley & Van Kampen Mut. Fund Sec. 
Litig., No. 03 Civ. 8208 (RO), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20758 (D.N.Y. 
Apr. 14, 2006); In re Oppenheimer Funds Fees Litig., 426 F. Supp. 2d 
157 (D.N.Y. 2006); In re Evergreen Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 423 F. 
Supp. 2d 249 (D.N.Y. 2006); Dumond v. Mass. Fin. Servs. Co., Civ. A. 
No. 04-11458-GAO, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1933 (D. Mass. Jan. 19, 
2006); Forsythe v. Sun Life Fin., Inc., 417 F. Supp. 2d 100 (D. Mass. 
2006); In re Goldman Sachs Mut. Funds Fee Litig., No. 04 Civ. 2567 
(NRB), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1542 (D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2006); In re Eaton 
Vance Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 403 F. Supp. 2d 310 (D.N.Y. 2005); 
Brever v. Federated Equity Mgmt. Co., 233 F.R.D. 429 (D. Pa. 2005); 
Stegall v. Ladner, 394 F. Supp. 2d 358 (D. Mass. 2005); In re Davis 
Selected Mut. Funds Litig., No. 04 Civ. 4186 (MGC), 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 23203 (D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2005); In re Eaton Vance Mut. Funds 
Fee Litig., 380 F. Supp. 2d 222 (D.N.Y. 2005); ING Principal Prot. 
Funds Derivative Litig., 369 F. Supp. 2d 163 (D. Mass. 2005); Gilliam 
v. Fid. Mgmt. & Research Co., Civ. A. No. 04-11600-NG, 2005 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 10478 (D. Mass. 2005); Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., No. 
04 C 8305, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39560 (D. Ill. Apr. 7, 2005); Wicks v. 
Putnam Inv. Mgmt.. LLP, Civ. A. No. 04-10988-GAO, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 4892 (D. Mass. Mar. 28, 2005); Strigliabotti v. Franklin Res., 
Inc., No. C 04-00883 SI, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9625 (D. Cal. Mar. 7, 
2005); Lieber v. Invesco Funds Group, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 2d 852 (D. 
Tex. 2005); Zucker v. Aim Advisors, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 2d 845 (D. Tex. 
2005); Yampolsky v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Advisers Inc., No. 03 Civ. 
5710 (RO), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8573 (D.N.Y. May 11, 2004); 
Millenco L.P. v. meVC Advisors, Inc., Civ. A. No. 02-142-JJF, 2002 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19512 (D. Del. Aug. 21, 2002); Rohrbaugh v. Inv. Co. 
Inst., Civ. A. No. 00-1237, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13401 (D.D.C. July 
2, 2002); Green v. Fund Asset Mgmt., L.P., 147 F. Supp. 2d 318 
(D.N.J. 2001); Strougo v. BEA Assocs., No. 98 Civ. 3725 (RWS), 2000 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 346 (D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2000); Strougo v. BEA Assocs., 
No. 98 Civ. 3725 (RWS), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3021 (D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 
1999); Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming, Case No. AMD 98-2162, 1999 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22001 (D. Md. Jan. 20, 1999); Levy v. Alliance 
Capital Mgmt. L.P., No. 97 Civ. 4672 (DC), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
16749 (D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 1998); Green v. Fund Asset Mgmt., L.P., 19 F. 
Supp. 2d 227 (D.N.J. 1998); King v. Douglass, 973 F. Supp. 707 (D. 
Tex. 1996); In re TCW/DW N. Am. Gov’t Income Trust Sec. Litig., 941 
F. Supp. 326 (D.N.Y. 1996); Langner v. Brown, 913 F. Supp. 260 
(D.N.Y. 1996); Olesh v. Dreyfus Corp., No. CV-94-1664 (CPS), 1995 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21421 (D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 1995); Wexler v. Equitable 
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Capital Mgmt. Corp., No. 93 Civ. 3834 (RPP), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
1651 (D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 1994); Meyer v. Oppenheimer Mgmt. Corp., 715 
F. Supp. 574 (D.N.Y. 1989); Meyer for Meyer v. Oppenheimer Mgmt. 
Corp., 707 F. Supp. 1394 (D.N.Y. 1988); Meyer v. Oppenheimer Mgmt. 
Corp., 691 F. Supp. 669 (D.N.Y. 1988); Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., 
Inc., 659 F. Supp. 1153 (D. Ill. 1987). 
 
The only section 36(b) decision from the D. C. Circuit is 
Rohrbaugh v. Inv. Co. Inst., Civ. A. No. 00-1237, 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 13401 (D.D.C. July 2, 2002). 
 
The decisions in the Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits that 
follow Gartenberg are as follows: 
Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int’l, 248 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 
2001); Gallus v. Ameriprise Fin., 497 F. Supp. 2d 974 (D. Minn. 2007); 
Siemers v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. C 05-04518 WHA, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 21935 (D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2007); In re Am. Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 
Case No. CV-04-5593 GAF (RNBx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8276 (D. 
Cal. Jan. 17, 2007); Gallus v. Am. Express Fin. Corp., 370 F. Supp. 2d 
862 (D. Minn. 2005); Strigliabotti v. Franklin Res., Inc., No. C 04-
00883 SI, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9625 (D. Cal. Mar.7, 2005); Migdal v. 
Rowe Price-Fleming Int’l, Inc., Civ. No. AMD 98-2162, 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 22853 (D. Md. Mar. 20, 2000); Batra v. Investors Research 
Corp., 144 F.R.D. 97 (D. Mo. 1992). 
 
The decisions in the First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth 
Circuits that refer to Gartenberg are as follows: 
Green v. Nuveen Advisory Corp., 295 F.3d 738 (7th Cir. 2002); 
Green v. Fund Asset Mgmt., L.P., 286 F.3d 682 (3d Cir. 2002); Romano 
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 834 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 
1987); In re Franklin Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 478 F. Supp. 2d 677 
(D.N.J. 2007); Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., No. 04 C 8305, 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 13352 (D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2007); Sins v. Janus Capital 
Mgmt., LLC, Civ. A. No. 04-cv-01647-WDM-MEH, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 90673 (D. Colo. Dec. 15, 2006); Hunt v. Invesco Funds Group, 
Civ. A. No. H-04-02555, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40944 (D. Tex. June 5, 
2006); Dumond v. Mass. Fin. Servs. Co., Civ. A. No. 04-11458-GAO, 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1933 (D. Mass. Jan. 19, 2006); Forsythe v. Sun 
Life Fin., Inc., 417 F. Supp. 2d 100 (D. Mass. 2006); In re Columbia 
Entities Litig., Civ. A. No. 04-11704-REK, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
33439 (D. Mass. Nov. 30, 2005); Stegall v. Ladner, 394 F. Supp. 2d 358 
(D. Mass. 2005); Yameen v. Eaton Vance Distribs., 394 F. Supp. 2d 
350 (D. Mass. 2005); In re Dreyfus Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 428 F. Supp. 
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2d 342 (D. Pa. 2005); Jacobs v. Bremner, 378 F. Supp. 2d 861 (D. Ill. 
2005); ING Principal Prot. Funds Derivative Litig., 369 F. Supp. 2d 
163 (D. Mass. 2005); Gilliam v. Fid. Mgmt. & Research Co., Civ. A. No. 
04-11600-NG, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10478 (D. Mass. May 3, 2005); 
Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., No. 04 C 8305, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
39560 (D. Ill. Apr. 7, 2005); Wicks v. Putnam Inv. Mgmt. LLP, Civ. A. 
No. 04-10988-GAO, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4892 (D. Mass. Mar. 28, 
2005); Lieber v. Invesco Funds Group, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 2d 852 (D. 
Tex. 2005); Zucker v. Aim Advisors, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 2d 845 (D. Tex. 
2005); Benak v. Alliance Capital Mgmt. L.P., Civ. A. No. 01-5734, 2004 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12231 (D.N.J. Feb. 9, 2004); Millenco L.P. v. meVC 
Advisors, Inc., Civ. A. No. 02-142-JJF, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19512 
(D. Del. Aug. 21, 2002); Miller v. Mitchell Hutchins Asset Mgmt., Inc., 
No. 01-CV-0192-DRH, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27675 (D. Ill. Mar. 12, 
2002); Green v. Nuveen Advisory Corp., No. 97 C 5255, 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 14047 (D. Ill. Sept. 6, 2001); Green v. Fund Asset Mgmt., L.P., 
147 F. Supp. 2d 318 (D.N.J. 2001); Krantz v. Fidelity Mgmt. & 
Research, Co., 98 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D. Mass. 2000); Krantz v. 
Prudential Invs. Fund Mgmt. L.L.C., 77 F. Supp. 2d 559 (D.N.J. 1999); 
Green v. Fund Asset Mgmt., L.P., 19 F. Supp. 2d 227 (D.N.J. 1998); 
King v. Douglass, 973 F. Supp. 707 (D. Tex. 1996); In re Nuveen Fund 
Litig., Case No. 94 C 360, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8071 (D. Ill. June 5, 
1996); Kamen v. Kemper Financial Servs., Inc., 659 F. Supp. 1153 (D. 
Ill. 1987). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
